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Louis Michael Seidman'
Akhil Amar's new book on criminal procedure' is as important for the
broad trend it reflects as for the many interesting ideas it contains. 2 Amar is
a progressive who, in other works, has argued powerfully for more democratic
and humane constitutional principles. Yet in this book, he sharply attacks the
* Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I am grateful to David Cole., Bill Stuntz,
Mark Tushnet, and Frederick Weisberg for commenting on an earlier draft of this Review and to a superb
research assistant, Keith Benes. I owe special thanks to Akhil Amar. who not only read a previous draft,
but also spent many hours helping me sharpen criticisms of his own work. His efforts went far beyond the
usual bounds of intellectual generosity and openness. Needless to say. he bears no responsibility for the
end product.
1. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONsITrtTION AND CRIMtNAL PROCEDURE FiRsT PPiNciPUEs (1997).
2. The book consists of a compendium of pieces previously published in slightly different form in
various law reviews. See Akil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles. 107 HARv. L REv. 757
(1994); Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure. 33 ANt. CRLIM. L REv. 1123
(1996); Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVtS L REv. 1169
(1995); Akhil Reed Amar, Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles. 84 GEO. LJ. 641 (1996): Akhil
Reed Amar & Ren&e B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self.Incrimination Clause. 93
MICH. L REv. 857 (1995).
3. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignry,
Majority Rule, and the Denominator Problem, 65 U. CoLo. L REv. 749 (1994) (hereinafter Amar, Central
Meaning] (arguing that the central pillar of republican government is popular sovereignty); Akhil Reed
Amar, Did the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights Against the States?. 19 HARV. J.L
& PUB. POL'Y 443 (1996) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment bars states from abridging the right to
bear arms, freedom of speech, and other constitutional rights); Akhil Reed Amar. The Fifteenth Amendment
and "Political Rights," 17 CARDozO L. REv. 2225 (1996) (arguing that the Fifteenth Amendment should
be read to protect the right to hold office, be voted for, serve in the military, and serve on a jury): Akhil
Reed Amar, Remember the Thirteenth, 10 CONsT. COMMENTARY 403 (1993) (hereinafter Amar. The
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progressive orthodoxy of criminal procedure. Amar allies himself with the
opponents of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and the warrant
requirement. He argues against suppression of the "fruits" of incriminating,
coerced statements and for a general reorientation of criminal procedure toward
factual guilt and innocence. In short, although many of his ideas are
idiosyncratic and resist ideological pigeonholing, one cannot miss the fact that
he ends up enthusiastically embracing main elements of the conservative
critique of criminal procedure liberalism.
Because Amar is among our most energetic and erudite constitutional
scholars, his ideas are certain to receive wide attention. Because the ideas are
interesting and powerfully presented, they deserve examination on their own
terms. For reasons set out in Part II of this Review, it turns out that at least
some of the ideas are at least somewhat oversold. I argue that there may be
more to Warren Court reforms than is commonly acknowledged these days.
Apart from the ideas themselves, however, the very fact that someone like
Amar has written this book is also a fact of considerable significance. The
book simultaneously symbolizes and helps propel the flood tide away from
criminal procedure liberalism.
Even in its heyday, political support for the Warren Court revolution was
fragile.4 Today, it has more or less collapsed. Amar is hardly the only liberal
academic who has gotten off the criminal procedure bandwagon, 5 and outside
the academy, the trend is still more striking.6 The recent "liberal" Clinton
appointees to the Supreme Court seem as unfriendly to criminal procedure
liberalism as their conservative colleagues,7 and much of President Clinton's
own success reflects his identification of the Democratic Party with the forces
of "law and order."8
In short, this book is part of a significant movement that has produced a
secular change in the politics of criminal procedure. Accordingly, its
Thirteenth] (arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment may prohibit child abuse).
4. See FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 8-25 (1970) (recounting contemporary political
opposition to Warren Court decisions).
5. It is noteworthy, for example, that Cass Sunstein, Jeffrey Rosen, and Richard Parker, each of whom
is associated with progressive causes in one way or another, are quoted as effusively praising the book on
the dust jacket.
6. The trend is epitomized by the transformation of Harold Rothwax, who began a lengthy and
distinguished career as a civil liberties lawyer and ended it as one of the harshest critics of Warren Court
criminal procedure decisions. See HAROLD J. RoTHwAx, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(1996).
7. For example, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer have frequently joined their conservative colleagues in
narrow readings of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997) (holding
that an officer making a traffic stop may order a passenger to get out of the car); Ohio v. Robinette, 117
S. Ct. 417 (1996) (holding that the defendant's consent to search was voluntary even though he had not
been told that he was free to go); Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (holding that the
reasonableness of a traffic stop does not depend upon the motivation of the officer).
8. See David Johnston & Tim Weiner, Seizing the Crime Issue, Clinton Blurs Party Lines, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 1996, at Al; Adam Nagourney, The Candidates: Dole Attacks on Crime but Clinton Is Ready, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 17, 1996, at Al.
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publication provides an occasion for reflection on why so many progressives
of an earlier era embraced the Warren Court reforms in the first place, on why
their vision has collapsed, and on what, if anything, deserves to be salvaged
from the wreckage. These broader issues are addressed in Part m of this
Review. Before turning to them, however, Professor Amar's specific proposals
require analysis.
I. AMAR'S PROGRAM
With characteristic energy and ebullience, Amar argues for wide-ranging
reform. Although his proposals cover many different areas of criminal
procedure, and although he advances a mix of arguments supporting them, they
are united by two broader themes: a desire to reorient criminal procedure
toward questions of factual guilt and innocence and a deep commitment,
manifested in Amar's other work as well,9 to notions of popular sovereignty.
With respect to the Fourth Amendment, these themes are reflected in
Amar's opposition to a per se warrant requirement and an exclusionary rule.
Amar claims that the modern Court has turned the Warrant Clause on its
head.' o Whereas the Framers were fearful of warrants and wanted to restrict
their use," the Court has read the Fourth Amendment as if it required
warrants in many cases.' 2 Doubtless, this reading is motivated by the fact that
the Warrant Clause seems to restrict searches in ways that would be rendered
meaningless if police were not required to secure warrants in the first place.
The Fourth Amendment's text provides that warrants can be issued only upon
probable cause and only on the basis of an affidavit specifically describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.' 3 These
requirements would be nullities if the police could always avoid them by the
simple expedient of searching and seizing without warrants. Why would the
Framers impose requirements for warrants if they did not mean to require
warrants? 4 The modern Court has solved the puzzle by reading the
9. See, e.g., Amar, Central Meaning, supra note 3; Akhil Rced Amar The Consent of the Governed:
Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 457 (1994): Akhil Reed Amar A Few
Thoughts on Constitutionalisr, Textualism, and Populism. 65 FORDHAM L REv. 1657 (1997).
10. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 3-17.
11. See id. at 15-16.
12. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States. 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948).
13. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
14. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 18; see also Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 566 (1971) (arguing
that "less stringent standards for reviewing the officer's discretion in effecting a warrantless arrest and
search would discourage resort to the procedures for obtaining a warrant"); Albert W. Alschuler, Bright
Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. Par. L REV. 227. 263 (1984) (arguing that it would be
"incongruous" for police officers to have "greater power to make seizures than magistrates have to
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reasonableness standard, applicable to all searches, as if it required warrants
for at least some of them.
15
Amar offers a different solution. He points out that at common law,
warrants immunized government officials from damage suits. The Framers
worried about this immunizing effect. They wanted to restrict, rather than
encourage, the ex parte warrant procedure because they believed that, in
general, the legality of searches should be determined by juries applying the
Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard. On this view, then, the problem
addressed by the Fourth Amendment is not the police circumvention of
warrants, but the police immunity from civil judgments that warrants afford.' 6
Accordingly, Amar favors a return to the Fourth Amendment's text and to
the original understanding. Police officers should not be required to get
warrants and should not be required to demonstrate probable cause before they
search and seize. Instead, searches and seizures should be judged according to
the Fourth Amendment's "reasonableness" standard, with reasonableness
determined primarily by juries adjudicating tort actions brought for damages.
Amar's commitment to traditional tort remedies is also reflected in his
opposition to the exclusionary rule. Amar argues that in many situations, the
exclusionary rule requires the suppression of evidence, the discovery of which
was not caused by the illegal activity. The exclusion of otherwise reliable
evidence therefore gives guilty defendants a windfall, while doing nothing to
compensate innocent victims of lawless police activity.'7 In contrast, a
beefed-up system of civil remedies would compensate innocent victims who
deserve compensation while also providing an optimal level of deterrence.' 8
Amar's proposals for Fifth Amendment reform reflect a similar concern
about guilt and innocence. On his view, the Self-Incrimination Clause 9
makes sense only as an effort to prevent wrongful conviction of the
innocent.20 Coerced self-incrimination is a problem because innocent people
can be made to appear guilty if they are forced to testify in their own defense.
Modern Fifth Amendment doctrine once again turns this concern on its head.
On the one hand, the privilege sometimes leads to the conviction of the
innocent when potential defense witnesses rely on their Fifth Amendment
authorize them").
15. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (noting that "[s]earhes conducted
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment").
16. As Amar puts it, "Warrants... were friends of the searcher, not the searched. They had to be
limited; otherwise, central officers on the government payroll in ex parte proceedings would usurp the role
of the good old jury in striking the proper balance between government and citizen after hearing lawyers
on both sides." AMAR, supra note 1, at 13.
17. See id. at 25-29.
18. See id. at 40-43.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself .... ).
20. See AMAR, supra note I, at 71.
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privilege to refuse to testify, thereby preventing defendants from presenting
exculpatory evidence to the jury.' On the other hand, modem Fifth
Amendment doctrine protects the guilty by excluding perfectly reliable
evidence gained as the "fruit" of compelled statements.2-
In one of the most insightful moves in the book, Amar ties these Fifth
Amendment difficulties to the scope of immunity currently accorded
defendants whose statements are compelled. Under modem doctrine, a
defendant is entitled to "use" and "derivative use" immunity."-3 The
prosecution is not only precluded from using the compelled statements
themselves; it is also prohibited from using evidentiary fruits of those
statements, including physical evidence that is secured as the result of
information conveyed by the defendant. Often, the derivative use restriction
puts the prosecution in a difficult position: Once the defendant has made
compelled statements, the prosecution may be unable to prove that its evidence
derives from an independent source.'
Amar's insight is that most of these problems in Fifth Amendment law can
be resolved by abolishing derivative use immunity. Under his proposal,
defendants would remain free to decline to testify at their own trials, and
compelled pretrial statements would continue to be inadmissible. A defendant
could be compelled to speak prior to trial, however, and the prosecution could
use his statements to develop new leads, including physical evidence and
additional witnesses, that could be presented at trial.25 Therefore, abolition of
derivative use immunity would continue to shield the innocent from being
made to appear guilty when they take the stand. Moreover, it would eliminate
the problem that sometimes prevents innocent defendants from calling
witnesses who might vindicate them. Under current law, prosecutors have a
legitimate reason for refusing to immunize these witnesses, because the
immunization imposes on the prosecution the burden of proving that evidence
they later develop against the witnesses was independent of their testimony at
trial.2 If derivative use immunity were abolished, prosecutors could no longer
21. See id. at 49-51; see also Peter W. Tague., The Fifth Amendment: If an Aid to the Guilty
Defendant, an Impediment to the Innocent One, 78 GEO.l.. I., 1 (1989) (noting that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination "can shackle the innocent defendant from attempting to prove that
another person committed the crime").
22. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 49.
23. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441. 459 (1972).
24. For a dramatic-and, in my view, strained-application of this principle. see United States v.
North, 920 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam). in which the court reversed the conviction of Iran-
Contra defendant Oliver North. Although the prosecution took elaborate precautions to demonstrate that
its evidence was gathered prior to North's compelled testimony before a congressional committee, it was
unable to demonstrate to the court's satisfaction that prosecution witnesses had not been influenced by the
testimony. See id at 943. Other courts have been more restrained in applying the principle. See. e.g.. United
States v. Helmsley, 941 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1991).
25. See AMAR, supra note I, at 70-88.
26. Many lower courts have been sympathetic to this argument and have held that a judge should not
force an immunity grant. See, e.g., United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238. 1282-83 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United
States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 771-79 (2d Cir. 1980). But see Virgin Islands v. Smith. 615 F.2d 964. 969
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object to the immunization of defense witnesses because they would not lose
any evidence that they would have had otherwise.
Amar's proposal not only provides additional protection for the innocent,
it also reduces the amount of undeserved protection for the guilty. There is no
reason to doubt the reliability of physical or testimonial evidence gained as a
result of a defendant's compelled statements.27 The abolition of derivative use
immunity would allow the prosecution to examine the defendant under oath in
a controlled and civilized environment, with failure to cooperate subjecting the
defendant to contempt sanctions. Although the defendant's statements
themselves would remain inadmissible at trial, wholly reliable evidence
developed through the defendant's testimony would be admissible.2"
In his penultimate chapter and appendix to the book, Amar presents a grab
bag of proposals for reform of Sixth Amendment law,29 including reforms
designed to make the criminal jury a more viable institution. Once again, these
disparate proposals are united by his concern for popular sovereignty and his
emphasis on reliable guilt determinations. Thus, he would reverse Supreme
Court decisions holding that dismissal with prejudice is the only remedy for
speedy trial violations,30 thereby eliminating an undeserved windfall for guilty
defendants.3 When trial delay causes unreliable outcomes that endanger the
innocent, dismissal may be an appropriate remedy. In contrast, when the
problem is damage to reputation or lengthy pretrial incarceration, the
appropriate remedy is compensatory or punitive damages or release from
32prison. Similarly, Amar reconceives the public trial requirement as a
measure designed to protect the innocent and to guarantee public input into the
criminal justice system.33 The right to a jury trial, in some ways central to
(3d Cir. 1980) (noting that a court can grant use immunity if the defendant is otherwise prevented "from
presenting exculpatory evidence ... crucial to his case"); United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1204
(3d Cir. 1978) (recognizing the court's "inherent remedial power" to grant immunity where the prosecution
withheld it for purposes of distorting the factfinding process); Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process
Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 73, 168 (1974) (arguing that the court can force granting of immunity). Perhaps
the dilemma could be at least partially resolved by forcing the witness to claim her Fifth Amendment
privilege before the jury or by allowing the defense to argue to the jury that it should draw an adverse
inference from the witness's failure to testify. For a discussion, see STEPHEN A. SALTZBURO & DANI1L J.
CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 481 (5th ed. 1996).
27. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 84.
28. See id. at 87.
29. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the ight to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
30. See, e.g., Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
3 1. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 92.
32. See id. at 105-14.
33. See id. at 116-24.
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Amar's vision, is not (or not just) a protection for the defendant, but a
guarantee of democratic, public participation in the criminal justice process.34
Accordingly, neither the defense nor the prosecution should be permitted to
waive the right.3" The right to counsel is also a protection for the innocent
and a guarantee of factually reliable outcomes. It follows that lawyers should
be sharply restricted in their ability to present testimony that they know to be
perjured or to mislead jurors through aggressive cross-examination of witnesses
they know to be truthful.36
In a brief concluding chapter, Amar ties together his interpretations of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments and explains how these interpretations
relate to his broader constitutional methodology. Amar believes that we should
pay much more attention to the Constitution's text. In his view, "the
Constitution is not some ventriloquist's dummy that can be made to say
anything the puppeteer likes."" Therefore, he criticizes "leading scholars and
distinguished judges" who "have paid [little attention] to the text of the
Constitution while busily making criminal procedure pronouncements in its
name."
38
Yet Amar himself is not a simple textualist. "Textual argument," in his
view, is "a proper starting point for proper constitutional analysis. ',39
Nonetheless, "sometimes, plain-meaning textual arguments in the end must
yield to the weight of other proper constitutional arguments-from history,
structure, precedent, practicality, and so on." According to Amar, each of
these strands of constitutional argument can be united under a single broad
theme: "the simple idea that constitutional criminal procedure should protect
the innocent, and not needlessly advantage the guilty.""
II. AN EVALUATION
A. Amar's Methodology
One cannot help but admire the erudition and intelligence Amar brings to
the task of reforming criminal procedure. Many of his proposals are sensible
and overdue; all of them are interesting and worthy of serious consideration.
Beyond the specifics, perhaps the greatest strength of the book is the infectious
34. See id. at 120-23.
35. See id. at 120.
36. See id. at 141-44. Amar's apparent willingness to allow defense attorneys to make what will
amount to conclusive judgments as to whether their clients are lying is in some tension with the populist
and pro-jury views that animate the rest of the book.
37. Id. at 152.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 153.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 154.
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sense of enthusiasm and discovery that someone outside the discipline can
generate.42 Amar is not steeped in ancient criminal justice lore, and he is not
nursing old wounds suffered in long-forgotten battles. Accordingly, he can give
the field an authentically fresh look.
But if this fresh look is the book's greatest strength, it also leads to serious
problems. For all the originality of some of his proposals, it must be said that
Amar sometimes trumpets ideas as new when they are in fact merely newly
discovered by him. Amar is more than generous in his citation of the
scholarship of others,43 and he successfully unifies many strands of prior
arguments in ways that are truly original. Nonetheless, as Amar appropriately
acknowledges, much of his work builds on the work of others: His reading of
the Warrant Clause owes much to Telford Taylor;44 Richard Posner had
previously developed many of his arguments concerning the exclusionary rule
and its relationship to the Warrant Clause;45 his Fifth Amendment argument
is in some respects similar to Henry Friendly's;46  and, despite some
differences, his theory of the Speedy Trial Clause parallels that developed by
Anthony Amsterdam.47
Amar is dismissive of many others working in the field,48 yet he ignores
problems that many of those he dismisses would surely have noticed. For
example, one passage in the book seems to suggest that under current doctrine,
the right to counsel attaches at the point of arrest, rather than after formal
charge.49 His book treats most of formal doctrine at face value, although
42. Amar has been writing about and teaching criminal procedure for a number of years, but he
nonetheless often presents himself as an outsider. See, e.g., id. at ix-x (discussing Amar's desire to bring
a constitutional scholar's perspective to bear on criminal procedure).
43. See, e.g., id. at 179 n.4 (crediting many others for originating ideas that Amar defends in the
book).
44. See TELFORD TAYLOR, TWO STUDtES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1969).
45. See Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1981 SOp. CT. RsV. 49.
46. See Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37
U. CIN. L. REV. 671 (1968).
47. See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27 STAN. L. REV. 525
(1975).
48. For example, he writes: "Mhe kind of constitutional law discourse and scholarship that now
dominates criminal procedure is generally, in a word, bad constitutional law-constitutional law insouciant
about constitutional text, ignorant of constitutional history and inattentive to constitutional structure."
AMAR, supra note I, at ix-x.
49. See id. at 138-39. This passage is more than a little puzzling. The Supreme Court has held that
the right to counsel attaches only after formal charge, see Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986); United
States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180 (1984); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972), and it is hard to believe
that Amar is not aware of this fact. Indeed, at one point, Amar correctly cites Moran and Gouveia for the
proposition that "the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until the initiation of formal
adversary criminal proceedings." AMAR, supra note i, at 221 n.201. Yet in the passage cited above, Amar
clearly implies that the right attaches at the point of arrest. Amar writes:
Given the explicit words of the counsel clause, and the overall architecture of the Sixth
Amendment, the "right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for [one's] defence" is triggered
when and because a person is "accused" of "criminal" wrongdoing. As we saw in our
discussion of the speedy trial clause, the Sixth Amendment is accusation-based, because
accusation itself subjects a person to distinct risks. One risk is the threat of prolonged pretrial
detention-a threat triggered by arrest or indictment. ...
2288
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anyone with real world experience knows that an evaluation of it must take
into account widespread police perjury, 4 judicial nullification,5' the
pervasive impact of the plea-bargaining system,52 and the severe underfunding
of defense counsel.53 In a book that has factual guilt as a central theme, it is
disappointing to find virtually nothing about the problem of eyewitness
identification and the Burger Court's evisceration of Warren Court protections
against factually erroneous identification testimony. Perhaps most
Even for an "accused" not subject to arrest or pretrial detention, the formal accusation itself of
course triggers another threat to liberty....
Of course, there may well be occasions prior to criminal accusation when general. innocence-
protecting principles will trigger an analogous right to counsel, but there is no blanket rule requiring
counsel before accusation. Consider, for example, the immemorial practice of excluding defense
lawyers from the grand jury inquest. An arrest may trigger the risk of extended pretrial detention, but
a grand jury summons does not.
Id. at 138-39 (footnotes omitted).
It is possible that the quoted passage is meant to criticize, rather than descnbe, Kirby, Gouveta. and
Moran. There are two reasons that this explanation seems unlikely, however. First. at other points in the
book, when Amar means to criticize existing doctrine, he leaves no ambiguity as to his intent. See. e.g.,
id. at I ("The Fourth Amendment today is an embarrassment. Much of what the Supreme Court has said
in the last half-century ... is initially plausible but ultimately misguided."). Second, the passage in question
itself cites to Kirby, Gouveia, and Moran, among other decisions. See id. at 139 & 247-48 nn.220-22. These
citations strongly suggest that Amar is describing the holding of cases rather than criticizing them. His
parenthetical after the citation to Kirby describes the case as "'suggesting that all Sixth Amendment
guarantees are accusation-based," id. at 247 n.220, and the text to which this footnote is appended makes
clear that he links accusation to arrest, see id. at 138-39. In fact, however, Kirby emphatically rejects the
proposition that counsel attaches after arrest: "[A] person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to
counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against
him." Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688. Amar's citation to Moran includes a parenthetical describing the case as
"finding no Sixth Amendment right to counsel during interrogation in police station prior to accusation and
rejecting contrary language of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Escobedo v. iilmois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964)." AMAR, supra note I, at 248 n.222. This is an accurate summary of the holding. What the
summary neglects to say, however, is that the Court's holding turns on the broader proposition that Sixth
Amendment rights are not triggered by arrest in the absence of formal charge.
50. See Morgan Cloud, Judges, 'Testilying,' and the Constitution, 69 S. CAL L REv. 1341, 1350-55
(1996); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What To Do About It. 67 U. COLO. L REv.
1037, 1041-48 (1996). But cf. AMAR, supra note I, at 56-57 & 206 nn.49-52 (criticizing police deception
in securing statements from suspects).
51. But see AMAR, supra note 1, at 56-57 (noting that "judicial decisions have created a divergence
between theory and practice" and raising the possibility that "the police are tempted to subvert formal rules
because the rules make no sense").
52. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE LJ. 1979. 1979 (1992). See
generally Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial. Alternatives to the
Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931 (1983) (discussing the costs of abolishing plea bargaining
and possible alternatives).
53. See Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the Constitutional
Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 656-63 (1986): Douglas W. Vick.
Poorhouse Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrary Death Sentences. 43 BUF. L
REv. 329, 377-97 (1995).
54. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977) (holding that the product of unnecessarily
suggestive identification procedures should be admitted when the identification is "reliable"): United States
v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300 (1973) (holding that there is no fight to counsel for photographic identification
procedures); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (holding that there is no right to counsel for
identification procedures conducted before formal charge).
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egregiously, the book devotes only scant attention to the problem of race and
the ways in which it intersects with criminal procedure protections.
55
Perhaps some of these flaws should be forgiven on the ground that Amar's
book is ultimately about constitutional methodology-history, text, and
structure-rather than about the practicalities of the criminal justice system,
The problem, though, is that Amar himself believes that history, text, and
structure cannot be separated from real world outcomes. He is surely right to
insist that "proper methodology of constitutional criminal procedure does not
blind itself to practical effects., '56 It seems a shame, then, that the book does
not pay more attention to these effects.
Moreover, Amar's methodological arguments have problems of their own.
Although he decries the fact that so few criminal procedure scholars are
familiar with constitutional law,57 he himself suggests a view of modem
constitutional practice with which many constitutional scholars would disagree.
For example, his book begins with a lengthy lament about the untidy state of
Fourth Amendment law. On his view, Fourth Amendment doctrine consists of
a hodgepodge of rules, exceptions to rules, ad hoc adjustments, and outright
anomalies that can be justified by neither text nor history and that, taken as a
whole, fail to reflect any sensible or unified theory or policy.5 Some of these
criticisms are surely on target, but Amar fails to acknowledge that similar
complaints could be advanced against virtually any area of constitutional
doctrine. For better or worse, what American constitutional law amounts to is
a confusing mixture of textual and doctrinal exegesis, tradition, policy analysis,
political accommodation, reasoning from historical experience, and randomly
preserved detritus from past generations, all of which stubbornly resist
generalization or rationalizing theory.59
55. At a few points in the book, Amar makes passing reference to the intersection between problems
of race and criminal justice, although he nowhere engages in sustained analysis. See, e.g., AMAR, supra
note 1, at 37 ("Even if racially disparate impact alone does not violate the Constitution, surely equal
protection principles call for concern when blacks bear the brunt of a government search or seizure policy.
Thus, in a variety of search and seizure contexts, we must honestly address racially imbalanced effects and
ask ourselves whether they are truly reasonable."); id. at 160 ("[lin asking the 'race question' we must also
remember that racial minorities are often the victims of crime, too."). For sophisticated and detailed
discussions of the issue, see RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW (1997); David Cole, The
Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall Kennedy's "Politics of Distinction," 83 GEO. LJ.
2547 (1995); and Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters"-Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth
Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REv. 203 (1991).
56. AMAR, supra note I, at 154.
57. He writes:
Scholars should know better, but too few of those who write in criminal procedure do serious,
sustained scholarship in constitutional law generally, or in fields like federal jurisdiction and
remedies. As a result, discourse in constitutional criminal procedure has evolved separately,
cutting itself off from larger themes of constitutional, remedial, and jurisdictional theory.
Id. at 115. I have noted a similar problem, although I hope in less dismissive tones. See Louis Michael
Seidman, ABSCAM and the Constitution, 83 MicH. L. REv. 1199, 1203-04 (1985) (book review).
58. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 1-31.
59. For a sustained argument that this eclecticism is a virtue, see PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTrruTIONAL
INTERPRETATION (1991).
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To take an example almost at random, consider the First Amendment
public forum doctrine. The Court has fashioned out of whole cloth elaborate,
but nonetheless inconsistently applied, distinctions between traditional and
nontraditional' and open and limited61 public fora. The cases are full of
confused discussion of content neutrality, viewpoint neutrality, and subject
matter neutrality.62 None of this doctrine has any clear grounding in the text
of the First Amendment or in practices at the time of the Framing. The cases
are not only internally inconsistent, but also fail to reflect a coherent theory
about the obligation of the government to subsidize speech,63 much less a
coherent view about subsidization of the exercise of constitutional rights more
generally.64 In short, public forum law is-and for that matter, many other
areas of constitutional law are-every bit as confused as criminal procedure.
Given the fact that the Court is applying two hundred years of precedent,
developed through compromise by a multi-member body operating under
important political constraints and without agreement as to appropriate
methodologies, it could hardly be otherwise. 5
Amar's criticisms are especially ironic in light of his own methodological
eclecticism. Pragmatic and eclectic approaches have the great virtue of
allowing considerable flexibility. Of course, the downside of this virtue is that
they are also open to the very sort of "ventriloquist's dummy" manipulation
60. Compare United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180 (1983) (holding that the sidewalk near a court
is a traditional public forum), with United States v. Kokinda. 497 U.S. 720. 727 (1990) (holding that the
sidewalk near a post office is not a public forum).
61. Cf. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n. 460 U.S. 37. 45.46 (1983) (distinguishing
between "quintessential" public fora, "voluntary" public fora, and public property that is "not by tradition
or designation a forum for public communication"). Compare Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496. 515 (1939)
(holding that streets and parks are open public fora). with Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna
Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 655 (1981) (holding that a state fair is a limited public forum).
62. Compare U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns. 453 U.S. 114. 132 (1981)
(holding that even when property is not a public forum, government regulation must be content neutral).
with Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (upholding a content-based restriction
because it was viewpoint neutral), and Police Dep't v. Mosley. 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating a
viewpoint-neutral restriction because it limited subject matter).
63. Compare Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent. 466 U.S. 789. 807 (1984)
(holding that the accumulation of signs posted on public property was a sufficient substantive evil to justify
a limitation on speech), with Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (holding that the
accumulation of litter on public property was an insufficient substantive evil to justify a limitation on
speech).
64. Compare, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (holding that the government may condition
access to family planning funds on a recipient's not giving advice concerning abortion). with Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 841 (1987) (holding that the government may not condition a
permit to rebuild a beachfront home on a grant of an easement to allow public access to the beach). See
generally Louis MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TuJSHNET, REMNANTS OF BEt: CoNm-rmPotARY
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUEs 74-77 (1996) (discussing the incoherence of the conditional offer doctrine).
65. See generally PHILIP BOBBITI, CONsTTrrtONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTrTIOs (1982)
(discussing various approaches to constitutional interpretation and justification of judicial review): Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L REv. 1189
(1987) (arguing that there is some coherence in the various kinds of constitutional interpretive arguments
that have been developed over time). For one explanation of this state of affairs emphasizing the
contradictions generated by multi-member decisionmaking bodies, see Frank H. Easterbrook. Ways of
Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802 (1982).
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that Amar decries." Consider, for example, Amar's textualism. He vigorously
criticizes the willingness of other constitutional scholars to ignore text67 and
fills many pages with detailed textual analysis. It is not always clear, however,
that this analysis imposes any meaningful restraints on his ability to vindicate
his own policy preferences. For example, Amar seems to suggest that the
exclusionary rule violates the Sixth Amendment's "public trial" requirement.68
This reading of the Sixth Amendment text, which, of course, speaks only of
public access to the trial, and not of rules of evidence for the trial, is at best
expansive and perhaps altogether fanciful. 69 It is not coincidental that Amar's
willingness to indulge this broad readiig leads to a result that he also favors
on policy grounds.
In contrast, when Amar turns to the putative warrant requirement in the
Fourth Amendment, he suddenly becomes a strict constructionist. If the public
trial requirement can be read as prohibiting the exclusionary rule, then
certainly the text of the Fourth Amendment is expansive enough to encompass
a modified warrant requirement. Perhaps warrants are necessary to make the
"people ... secure" from unreasonable searches. Perhaps some, but not all,
searches without warrants are "unreasonable." Of course, this reading would
run counter to Amar's policy proposals. Accordingly, in this context, strict
construction is required: "To read in a warrant requirement that is not in the
text-and then to read in various nontextual exceptions to that so-called
requirement-is not to read the Fourth Amendment at all. It is to rewrite it."
70
Similar difficulties infect Amar's discussion of constitutional history.
Amar's knowledge of this field is encyclopedic, and he brilliantly succeeds in
fleshing out his arguments with historical support that others have ignored.
Much of this material is fascinating. Unfortunately, however, Amar never
66. AMAR, supra note I, at 152.
67. See id.; supra text accompanying note 38.
68. Amar states:
Mhe public trial was designed to infuse public knowledge into the trial itself, and, in turn, to
satisfy the public that truth had prevailed at trial.... All these values have been turned upside
down by modem doctrines that-in the name of the Constitution, no less-exclude evidence the
public knows to be true....
... [V]arious modem exclusionary rules are not merely indefensible as a matter of text,
history, and structure, and remedially inapt to boot. These modem upside-down rules also do
violence to the elaborate adjudicatory architecture of the truth-seeking, confidence-enhancing,
innocence-protecting, public trial envisioned by the Sixth Amendment.
AMAR, supra note 1, at 119.
69. Others have noted a tendency toward such readings in Amar's earlier work, See, e.g., Alex
Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1639 (1993) (criticizing Amar's
suggestion in Amar, The Thirteenth, supra note 3, that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits child abuse).
70. AMAR, supra note 1, at 10. Oddly, Amar himself would "rewrite" the Fourth Amendment to create
a warrant regime that bears considerable resemblance to the one he attacks. See id. at 38-39 & 197 n.190
(pointing out that, under his proposal, "the results of many 'warrant requirement' cases need not necessarily
be jettisoned, although their logic would need to be reconceptualized"); see also infra note 85.
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explains exactly why we should treat historical practice as important.7 The
Framers' world notoriously was not our own, and the differences are nowhere
more apparent than when talking about issues of criminal procedure. The late
eighteenth century was a world not only without organized crime, but also
without an organized police force.72 Bill of Rights protections applied only
to the federal government,73 which had exceedingly limited law enforcement
responsibilities. Criminal trials were typically conducted without counsel,74
and the defendant had no right to testify in his own defense."5 There were no
telephones, no automobiles, no drugs, no gangs, no drive-by shootings, and,
indeed, few people. Why should anyone suppose that the Framers' notions
about criminal procedure would have much relevance for us?
76
In light of these difficulties, Amar concedes that some "translation" of
historical practice is necessary to make it comport with modem reality."n But
how much translation? Perhaps if the Framers were faced with modem
conditions, they would favor warrants and an exclusionary rule to make the
people "secure." Or, for that matter, perhaps in the face of current threats to
public order, they would abandon Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections
altogether.78
71. I do not mean to say that Amar always treats history as dispositivc. See. e.g.. AMAR. supra note
1, at 8 ("'he problem with the so-called warrant requirement is not simply that it is not in the text and that
it is contradicted by history. The problem is also that, if taken seriously, a warrant requirement makes no
sense."). Indeed, part of the difficulty is that Amar's unwillingness to commit to a constitutional
methodology sometimes makes his choice between methodologies seem tendentious.
72. See David A. Sklanski, Criminal Procedure and the Private Police 40-43 (1998) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Yale Law Journal).
73. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833).
74. An Act for the Punishment of Certain Crimes Against the United States (The Federal Crimes Act
of 1790), ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. 112, 118, required appointment of counsel in capital cases, but not otherwise.
Most trials were conducted without counsel. See WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
AMERICAN COURTS 27-43 (1955); Eben Moglen. Taking the Fifth: Reconsidering the Ongns of the
Constitutional Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 92 Micii. L. REv. 1086. 1089 (1994).
75. See AMAR, supra note I, at 214 n.133 (citing Joel N. Brodansky. The Abolition of the Parry,
Witness Disqualification: An Historical Survey, 70 KY. UJ. 91 (1982)).
76. Carol Steiker has criticized Amar's argument on similar grounds. See Carol S. Stetkcr, Second
Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 820. 823-25 (1994).
77. See AMAR, supra note I, at 29-30 (noting that "the traditional eighteenth-century civil model must
be brought into the twenty-first century"); cf Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation. 71 TEX• L REV.
1165, 1173 (1993) (proposing a "sketch of a practice of fidelity in law. modcled on a practice of translation
in language").
78. Of course, this is a problem that all constitutional "translators" face. For an especially powerful
description of the difficulty, see Michael Klarman, Antifidelity. 70 S. CAL L REv. 381. 395. 402.-03
(1997). As Klaman writes:
Translators have selected an arbitrarily low level of generality at which to translate. They adjust
the Framers' constitutional commitments to reflect changed circumstances, but fail to ask
whether the Framers would have remained committed to the same concepts had they been aware
of future circumstances....
•. If we treat all changed circumstances as relevant variables, then we simply will have
converted the Framers into us, and asking how they would resolve a problem is no different
from asking how we ourselves would resolve it. Yet a decision to treat some changed
circumstances as variables and others as constants seems entirely arbitrary.
Id. at 395, 402.
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At times, then, Amar's pragmatism seems too undisciplined. The more
serious problem, however, is that on other occasions, his approach is much too
rigid. As already noted, Amar's preoccupation with text and history sometimes
causes him to pay insufficient attention to how his proposals might work in
practice. These problems are especially acute in the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment contexts, to which I now turn.
79
B. Amar's Fourth Amendment Proposals
Amar is entirely convincing when he argues that the Court's emphasis on
a warrant requirement fits uneasily with the intent of the Framers, at least as
narrowly conceived. Still, the overriding command of the Fourth Amendment
is to make "the people ... secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects."8 For a pragmatic translator, the question is not how the Framers
meant to achieve this goal in their time, but how we can best achieve it in
ours.
8 1
From this pragmatic point of view, there is more to be said for a warrant
requirement than Amar imagines. This is true whether one focuses on the
individual victim of the search or on the problem of systemic deterrence.
Focusing first on the individual, once an invasion of privacy has occurred,
legal remedies are unlikely to be effective. To be sure, if property is seized or
destroyed, perhaps the property can be returned or the individual compensated
for his loss. 82 But most of modem Fourth Amendment law deals, not with
property, but with privacy and autonomy. Imagine, for example, a person
awakened in the dead of night and then made to stand naked while the police
rummage through his house. Perhaps damage remedies would provide systemic
deterrence of future invasions of this sort (although, for reasons addressed
below,83 this claim, too, is doubtful). It should be clear, however, that money
damages cannot make the individual "whole" after the event. The goods in
question are simply not commensurate. Once an individual has been
humiliated, embarrassed, or terrified, the injury is in a real sense irreparable.
Trying to guess at the amount of money that a person would "trade" for this
79. Although approximately one-third of Amar's book discusses Sixth Amendment issues, see AMAR,
supra note 1, at 89-144, I have limited my critical analysis to his Fourth and Fifth Amendment proposals.
I have done so because these proposals raise the most troubling questions about Amar's approach, as well
as the most serious challenge to criminal procedure liberals.
80. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
81. Cf. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 367
(1974) (suggesting that the Fourth Amendment is "a regulatory canon requiring government to order its law
enforcement procedures in a fashion that keeps us collectively secure").
82. Indeed, for just this reason, the "plain view" doctrine, which permits warrantless seizures of
property when the seizures can be accomplished without invasions of privacy, makes sense. See, e.g.,
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (explaining and defending the plain view doctrine).
83. See infra notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
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experience profoundly misunderstands what the experience is all about It
follows that a system of ex ante licensing may be more effective in dealing
with the problem of unlawful searches than a system of ex post compensation.
Our aim should be prevention before the fact, rather than cure when it is too
late. Therefore, the warrant requirement might be defended as a means of
making the people "secure" by providing a system of judicial review for
searches and seizures before they occur.85
Of course, at least in principle, the threat of damages might also provide
ex ante protection by deterring wrongful searches. It turns out, though, that
warrants have considerable advantages from the systemic deterrence
perspective as well. At first blush, it might seem that the warrant requirement
is perverse: The requirement does work only in cases where an officer has not
engaged in the evil that the requirement is meant to prevent. If the officer
conducts an unreasonable search, his conduct can be condemned because of its
unreasonableness, and there is no need for a warrant requirement to hold him
responsible. It is only when an officer's conduct is otherwise constitutionally
permissible that the Warrant Clause has bite. Since the purpose of the warrant
requirement is to prevent conduct that is otherwise unconstitutional, it might
seem that it is in just these cases that the requirement is also unnecessary.
84. Amar himself seems to understand and agree with this point. See AMAR. Isupra note I. at 43
("Early prevention is often better than after-the-fact remedy. The Fourth Amendment says its right 'shall
not be violated.' When judges can prevent violations before they occur, they should do so--especially if
after-the-fact damages could never truly make amends."); see also id. at 115 ("The first line of defense
must always be prevention.").
85. Again, Amar seems to understand and, to some extent, agree with this argument. He wntes:
Due process values may even call for judicial preclearance of certain types of government
searches and seizures, if there are good reasons for suspecting strong and systematic
overzealousness on the part of certain segments of executive officialdom. In some situations.
a search or seizure could be deemed constitutionally unreasonable because no prior approval
was sought from a more neutral and detached decision maker. Preclearance might also help firm
up the record of what facts the government had before the intrusion. thereby preventing officials
from dreaming up post hoc rationalizations.
Id. at 38-39.
Of course, to the extent that Amar concedes the value of warrants, he gives up on what is dtstinctive
about his approach. He therefore hastens to add that the "selective judicial preclearance" he favors is "a
far cry from the warrant requirement I have been attacking so insistently." Id. at 39. He claims that his
proposal differs from current law in two important respects. First. "Ujudicial preclearance would not be a
per se requirement of all searches and seizures, nor even a presumptive mandate, subject to well-defined
categorical exceptions." Id Instead, reasonableness judgments would be "pragmatic. contingent, and subject
to easy revision." Id. Second, "judicial preclearance would be in addition to. rather than instead of. after-
the-fact review in civil actions brought by the citizen target." Id.
With regard to the first point, Amar perhaps overestimates the "rule-like" quality of current doctrine.
See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text. He may also underestimate the need police officers have for
clear rules. As I argue below, the best justification for the warrant requirement is that even police officers
acting in good faith will find it difficult to make accurate judgments about the vague and fact-specific
standards for when searches are permissible. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text. It defeats the
purpose of the requirement if its scope is every bit as vague and fact-specific as the standards for the
searches and seizures themselves. With regard to the second point, I think that Amar is ight to worry about
the shielding effect of warrants. For reasons explained below, however, there is an argument that this
shielding effect would be more significant under the damages regime that he favors than under the
exclusionary rule regime that he rejects. See infra notes 107-112 and accompanying text.
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On closer analysis, however, the warrant requirement makes a good deal
of sense. 6 The difficulty is that even officers acting in good faith may
overestimate their own ability to determine whether their conduct is within
constitutional limits. Imagine, for example, parents who prohibit children from
crossing a busy street when not in the presence of an adult. The purpose of the
rule is to prevent children from taking unnecessary risks when crossing, yet the
rule has independent force only in cases where the children are disciplined
despite the fact that they have not taken such risks (since otherwise they could
be disciplined for taking the risks). A bright-line rule prohibiting crossings
under all circumstances might nonetheless be sensible. True, the child has not
taken an unnecessary risk in this case, but we cannot be confident of her
judgments in future cases. Better, then, to require parental supervision in all
cases instead of encouraging the child to make her own judgments.
Similarly, it may make sense to require judicial supervision of searches
and seizures in all cases and to enforce this bright-line requirement even in
cases where the police make the "right" decision on the particular facts before
them. This prophylactic approach is especially sensible because of the complex
and fact-specific nature of the inquiry.
As Amar points out, probable cause has never been a fixed standard with
a clear and precise meaning. 7 As vague as it is, however, a "reasonableness"
standard, which Amar would substitute for probable cause, is more amorphous
still. Instead of focusing on only one factor (the strength of the government's
case), a reasonableness standard asks the police to evaluate the interaction of
numerous factors, including the degree of the invasion, the seriousness of the
crime, and the need for the evidence. The result is that every case will
necessarily be unique, and resolution of any given case will provide little
guidance for how the next case should be resolved. Officers themselves may
therefore be better off with a rule that requires prior approval of individual
cases and discourages them from trying to generalize from past cases.88
All this is not to claim that the Warrant Clause, as presently administered,
is without problems. The requirement has become so riddled with complex
exceptions89 that an officer is at least as likely to err in determining whether
86. The argument in the next few paragraphs is a special application of the general argument for legal
formalism that Frederick Schauer develops with great sophistication. See Frederick Schauer, Formalism,
97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988).
87. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 19-20; cf. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) ("[Plrobablo
cause is a fluid concept... not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.").
88. Of course, if officers realized that they would be better off with prescreening, there would be no
need for a wan-ant requirement. An optional prescreening mechanism, which officers could utilize when
they believed it necessary, would be sufficient. The argument for a requirement therefore rests on the
empirical judgment that the police are likely to overestimate their own ability to make accurate probable
cause determinations, much as children overestimate their own ability to cross streets safely.
89. See, e.g., Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (delineating the "special
needs" exception); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 573 (1991) (car search exception); New York v.
Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712 (1987) (administrative search exception); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299
(1967) ("hot pursuit" exception).
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she must get a warrant as she is to err in determining whether she has probable
cause.90 Moreover, the Court's willingness to accord very substantial
discretion to magistrates' decisions whether to issue warrants, 9' and its
insistence that the exclusionary rule should be inapplicable when police rely
on warrants in good faith,92 mean that the Framers' original concern about the
shielding effect of warrants has some modern salience. This problem is
aggravated by the practice, permitted in some jurisdictions,93 of "magistrate
shopping" to find a judge willing to issue a warrant and by the absence of an
adversary process to guide judges in deciding whether the prerequisites for a
warrant have been met.
These defects in the warrant process are real, but they argue for reform of
the process rather than for its abandonment. The Court might address them by
abolishing some of the exceptions to the warrant requirement, by abolishing
or sharply constricting the good faith exception, by providing more rigorous
review of magistrate probable cause determinations, and by prohibiting
magistrate shopping. 94
In short, Amar is-and the Framers were-right to worry about the
potentially shielding effect of ex parte warrants, and Amar is right that the
present system has defects not imagined by the Framers. It does not follow,
however, that warrants cannot be made to work. The sensible solution to these
problems is to make the warrant procedure more reliable and to constrain its
shielding effect, not to abandon it entirely.
The argument for warrants substantially overlaps with the argument for the
exclusionary rule. Amar is transfixed by the idea that the exclusionary rule is
"upside down." 95 It takes effect only in cases where the police find what they
are looking for-cases where the defendant is almost certainly guilty. In these
cases, the defendant receives a windfall-the suppression of the evidence and,
often, dismissal of the underlying charge-that has no logical connection to the
constitutional violation. In contrast, the exclusionary rule provides no direct
90. Amar's reforms would make this problem worse rather than better. See supra note 85.
91. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 236-37.
92. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988 (1984); United States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897,
906 (1984).
93. See, e.g., United States v. Pace, 898 F.2d 1218, 1231 (7th Cir. 1990) (rejecting a blanket rule
prohibiting the government from submitting a warrant application to a second magistrate): cf. Leon, 468
U.S. at 918 (acknowledging the possibility of magistrate shopping).
94. The absence of defense counsel poses a more difficult problem. Obviously, the surprise necessary
to make searches successful might be jeopardized if the defendant's lawyer were informed of the pendency
of a warrant application. Even here, though, the problem might be at least partially remedied if we put our
minds to it. Perhaps jurisdictions could appoint a "devil's advocate." whose permanent function would be
to argue against warrant applications in much the way that some jurisdictions employ lawyers whose
permanent job is to speak on behalf of consumers against utility rate increases. Even if this solution is
deemed impractical, defendants are surely better off with imperfect ex ante review than with no such review
at all, at least so long as the shielding effect of warrants is constrained.
95. E.g., AMAR, supra note I, at 156.
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protection for innocent victims of unreasonable police searches where the
police fail to find incriminating evidence.96
There is surely something to this criticism. From the perspective of
individual remediation, the exclusionary rule is difficult to defend. This
argument has limited force, however. As argued above,' individual
remediation is difficult or impossible in any event. Once a violation occurs,
money damages (the main alternative to exclusion) are also ineffective in
returning a victim to the status quo ante. It follows that the defense of any
remedy must be largely prospective. Indeed, in some ways the very term
"remedy" is misleading. Our aim should be systemic deterrence, rather than
individual remediation. 9'
Moreover, while it is true that exclusion sometimes provides an undeserved
windfall, the same can be said of some damage awards. Amar favors punitive
damages, 99 which also give parties money they do not deserve in the name
of deterrence.'te It might be said that at least these parties have suffered
some unjustifiable loss, but even this will not be true if damages are used to
enforce the warrant requirement. 10' Imagine a case where the police have
96. Of course, to the extent that the exclusionary rule deters future searches without probable cause,
it provides indirect protection for the innocent. The probable cause requirement measures the ex ante
likelihood that a search will reveal evidence. It seems sensible to suppose that, holding other things equal,
the police are more likely to have probable cause to search guilty defendants than innocent defendants.
Enforcement of the requirement through the exclusionary rule therefore primarily benefits the innocent.
97. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
98. Amar sometimes seems to understand this point. He argues that "[e]arly prevention is often better
than after-the-fact remedy.... When judges can prevent violations before they occur, they should do so--
especially if after-the-fact damages could never truly make amends." AMAR, supra note 1, at 43. Yet he
unaccountably loses track of this understanding when discussing the preventive function of the exclusionary
rule. He argues that exclusion cannot be justified "merely [as] a judicially fashioned, empirical, pragmatic
and deterrence-based remedy for an antecedent Fourth Amendment violation." Id. at 151. This is so because
[j]udicial remedies must fit the scope of the right. For example, a court is not free, as a matter
of constitutional law, to play the "Leavenworth lottery": Because the government violated the
constitutional rights of A, judges spin the wheel and spring some lucky (but unrelated) convict
B from Leavenworth. This scheme might indeed deter-and the legislature might have the
power to enact this into law-but courts have no such power as a matter of traditional remedial
theory.
Id. at 151-52. Amar's hypothetical appeals to a powerful intuition, but if the aim is indeed prevention,
rather than cure, he needs to provide some argument to support the intuition. He never tells us what,
precisely, is wrong with a "Leavenworth lottery" or why the creation of such a lottery is an appropriate
exercise of the legislative, but not the judicial, function. In fact, his own proposals for punitive damages
function much like such a lottery. See infra notes 99-100 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying
notes 109-110.
99. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 41-42 & 199 n.215. Strikingly, he argues for such damages, not on
the ground that they provide individual remediation, but to avoid "systematic underdeterrence." Id. at 41-42.
100. Amar does suggest that not all the extra money need go to the plaintiff: Some "could flow to a
'Fourth Amendment Fund' to educate Americans about the amendment and comfort victims of crime and
police brutality." Id. at 42. Nonetheless, Amar implies that plaintiffs would receive some windfall,
presumably to give them adequate incentive to bring suit. See id.
101. Amar would abolish the warrant requirement. See id. at 4-5, 44. He emphasizes that his reforms
should be treated as a package, see id. at 180-81 n.5, so it may seem unfair to criticize him for anomalies
produced by adoption of one component of the package without the rest. Still, Amar acknowledges that
even in the absence of a per se requirement, some prescreening would be appropriate. See id. at 44; see
also supra note 85. Moreover, his claim that the exclusionary rule imposes unacceptable costs is based in
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probable cause and would have obtained a warrant had they asked for one. If
the police instead conduct a warrantless search, the defendant can hardly claim
that his privacy was unjustifiably invaded. Precisely the same privacy loss
would have occurred had the police bothered to obtain a piece of paper from
a judge before conducting the search. A defendant who receives damages in
this situation is awarded them, not in the name of corrective justice, but
because damages are necessary to create the right ex ante incentives. Although
a warrant would have done nothing to change the result in his case, we want
to encourage the police to get warrants in future cases for the benefit of future
search targets. Of course, this is precisely the same reason that evidence is
excluded at trial, and it results in a similar windfall for the search target who
benefits from the remedy.
It follows that the argument about the relative merits of the exclusionary
rule and civil damages, like the argument about the warrant requirement, must
rest on judgments about systemic deterrence. What method of enforcement is
most likely to make the "people ... secure" from the threat of unreasonable
searches and seizures at the least cost? Viewed in this way, the exclusionary
rule doubtless has problems, but there is once again more to say in its favor
than Amar supposes.
First, the costs of the rule are greatly overstated. Often, the appearance of
costs amounts to an optical illusion. When the police actually possess the
evidence and cannot use it, this appears to be a cost of the exclusionary rule.
It must be remembered, however, that the police obtained the evidence in the
first place only because they violated the Fourth Amendment. In recent years,
the Supreme Court has fashioned an exception to the exclusionary rule for
cases where, on a preponderance of the evidence, the police can show that they
would have discovered the evidence in any event had they not violated the
Amendment. 1°2 The exception means that, in many cases, evidence that is
suppressed would not have been found in the first place if an alternative,
effective deterrent had been in place to prevent the illegal search. Hence, loss
of evidence is often a cost of the Fourth Amendment itself rather than of the
means of enforcement.1
0 3
large part on cases where the police fail to get a warrant. See AMAR. supra note I. at 26. It seems
appropriate, therefore, also to note the costs imposed by a damage remedy in this context.
102. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984); cf. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533. 537-
39 (1988) (holding that evidence should not be suppressed when there is a lawful independent source for
it).
103. See Yale Kamisar, "Comparative Reprehensibility" and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary
Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1, 36 n.151, 47-48 (1987) (arguing that "costs" of the exclusionary rule are really
costs of the Fourth Amendment itself); cf. William J. Mertens & Silas Wassestrom. The Good Faith
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law. 70 GEo. U. 365.406-
11 (1981) (arguing that a tort remedy would result in the loss of more evidence than the exclusionary rule).
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Of course, as Amar emphasizes, there remain other cases where the
exclusionary rule does impose a loss. 14 One must ask, though, whether the
loss is greater than the losses produced by likely alternatives. Amar, along with
many others, 05 advocates an invigorated damage remedy directed against the
jurisdiction rather than against the individual officer.1"6  Perhaps
paradoxically, such a remedy might lead to the loss of more evidence than
losses suffered under the exclusionary rule. 1°7 To understand why, we need
to emphasize again the amorphous, fact-specific nature of Fourth Amendment
judgments. Amar treats the flexibility of the substantive standard he would
utilize as a virtue, and there is certainly something to be said for a "general
reasonableness" test that measures not only the strength of police evidence, but
also the extent of the invasion and the seriousness of the crime. Still, such an
approach is unlikely to produce many bright-line rules that the police can count
on. The result in each case will rest on its own individual mix of facts. This
problem is greatly aggravated by reliance on jury verdicts, which carry no stare
decisis effect.10
8
104. Amar offers two examples. First:
Suppose the police could easily get a wan-ant, but fail to do so because they think the case at
hand falls into a judicially recognized exception to the so-called warrant requirement. A court
later disagrees--and so, under current doctrine, the search was unconstitutional. But if the court
goes on to exclude the bloody knife, it does indeed confer a huge benefit on the murderer. The
police could easily have obtained a warrant before the search, so the illegality is not a but-for
cause of the introduction of the knife into evidence.
AMAR, supra note 1, at 26. Of course, this loss would also occur if there were a damage remedy in place
sufficient to deter the unlawful search in the first place. When deterrence succeeds, the costs of lost
evidence are attributable to substantive Fourth Amendment law, rather than to the exclusionary rule. Amar's
point is that the exclusionary rule imposes costs that a damage remedy avoids when deterrence fails. As
Amar himself acknowledges, however, the severity of this problem would be much reduced if his proposal
to abolish the warrant requirement were adopted. See id. at 44-45. It would also be much reduced if my
proposal to simplify the requirement by eliminating the confusing web of exceptions were put into effect.
See supra text accompanying notes 89-94.
Amar's second example involves a case where
the police search without enough justification to be "reasonable," and five minutes later,
independent information comes to the police station that would have nudged the probability
needle enough to make the search reasonable. Here, too, the illegality of the search when
conducted is not a but-for cause of the later introduction of the bloody knife, and exclusion
makes the murderer better off than he would have been had no Fourth Amendment violation
ever occurred.
AMAR, supra note 1, at 26. It is likely, however, that the inevitable discovery doctrine would preclude
suppression of this evidence under current law. Cf. United States v. Andrade, 784 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1986)
(holding that the inevitable discovery doctrine bars suppression of evidence because of an unlawful search
incident to arrest where it would have been discovered later in any event through an inventory search).
Indeed, Amar himself characterizes his proposal as a vast widening of that doctrine. See AMAR, supra note
1, at 193 n.137.
105. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,411,
422 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting); Posner, supra note 45, at 53-58.
106. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 41.
107. See Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 103, at 406-11.
108. Empirical data show that there is far more variation in decisions by individual jurors than in
decisions by individual legal professionals. See NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE AMERICAN
JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHs ABoUr JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS, AND OUTRAGEOUS
DAMAGE AWARDS 225-26 (1995). This result is hardly surprising: "[W]hile jurors typically have no
experience in awarding damages the professionals do have both training bearing on the calculation of
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On top of the vagaries of the substantive standard, the amount of damages
is also likely to be quite unpredictable. There is no real market in humiliation
and privacy invasion that can serve as a yardstick for juries. A given jury's
judgment as to what a particular case is "worth" will inevitably be intuitive
and ad hoc,'09 and jury judgments regarding punitive damages are likely to
be more unpredictable still. In short, police departments attempting to calculate
the risk and seriousness of liability before the fact are confronted with what
amounts to a lottery with potentially very large stakes-a lottery made far
riskier by elimination of the ex ante warrant procedure, which Amar also
advocates." 0 When confronted with uncertainties of this magnitude, a natural
reaction is to be risk averse. Police departments are likely to steer clear of the
constitutional line because they are so uncertain as to where the line is and
because crossing it might unpredictably lead to very large losses. The result
might well be under-policing, which would uncover much less evidence and
solve many fewer crimes than the Fourth Amendment, on its own terms, would
permit.
Thus, a damage remedy, like the exclusionary rule, ends up "excluding"
some evidence as a cost exchanged for the benefit of deterring some Fourth
Amendment violations. It does not follow, however, that the costs of the two
approaches are identical. A virtue of the exclusionary rule is that it usually'
does no more than take away the benefit of wrongful searches. The rule
eliminates the incentive to conduct an illegal search by depriving the police of
its benefit, but it usually does not impose additional costs on the police. It
would be as if the only penalty for robbing a bank were a requirement that the
robber return the stolen money. Because the rule usually does no more than
take away benefits, the risk of overdeterrence is much reduced.
Indeed, if there is a problem with the exclusionary rule, it is more likely
to be underdeterrence."2 Because the rule eliminates only the evidentiary
benefits of illegal searches, it imposes no deterrence when the police do not
seek to achieve those benefits. Thus, when officers uninterested in uncovering
evidence engage in gratuitous violence or harassment, or when they conduct
searches solely to confiscate contraband or weapons, the rule has little or no
damages and, equally important, a perspective on what appropriate awards are, based on their knowledge
of other cases." Id. at 226. Focusing on the reaction of individual jurors is misleading, however, since jury
verdicts are the product of group decisionmaking. It turns out that the group decisions made by jurors
actually exhibit less variation than decisions made by a single judge-a result probably explained by the
pooling effect of group decisionmaking. See id. at 226-32. Still, a jury decision in one case has no impact
on jury decisions in future cases. As Vidmar argues, legal professionals with knowledge of prior cases tend
to bring their decisions into line with those cases. See id. at 226. It therefore seems likely that the
precedential force of judicial decisionmaking will reduce variation over time. In contrast, the level of
variance for jurors will remain constant, since they have no knowledge of the outcomes of prior cases.
109. See id. at 226 (reporting that empirical data show "that the awarding of noneconomic damages
is a ... subjective process even for trained, experienced legal professionals").
110. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 39.
111. But, admittedly, not always. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
112. See AMAR, supra note I, at 28-29, 41-42, 156-58.
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deterrent effect. This is a serious problem, but it is, once again, a mistake to
look at the exclusionary rule in isolation. Damage remedies also pose an
underdeterrence problem. Many victims of police searches will appear
unattractive to juries, and few will have the knowledge or ability to initiate
civil litigation. In any event, the solution to the underdeterrence problem is not
the wholesale abandonment of the exclusionary rule. Instead, the problem
suggests that the rule needs to be supplemented. One characteristic of cases
where the rule does not deter is that they often (although concededly not
always) involve officers acting in bad faith. By definition, these are searches
and seizures in which the officers are not motivated by the desire to prosecute
the target, since if they were so motivated, the exclusionary rule would deter
them. Because these searches include a conscious mental element, they can be
deterred by a more carefully cabined damage remedy that poses less risk of
overdeterrence. In particular, most bad faith searches can be deterred by
holding officers liable only if they unreasonably ignore legal limits about
which they should have known."t3 Tort actions subject to this qualified
immunity at once deter bad faith searches and avoid the perverse incentive to
steer far clear of the line for fear of going over it.
The upshot, then, is that the optimal regime may be closer to the status
quo than many people imagine. As things stand, we have an exclusionary rule,
limited by the inevitable discovery doctrine," 4 to deter searches motivated
by the desire to obtain evidence, and a damage remedy, limited by a qualified
official immunity defense, '5 to deter searches conducted in bad faith. I do
not mean to claim that the present regime is perfect. Perhaps I have
miscalculated the risk of overdeterrence produced by the tort regime or the
costs produced by exclusion. Even if I have not done so, perhaps we could
imagine a hypothetical regime that would do a better job at less cost. In
principle, a carefully constructed system that imposed just the right level of
compensatory and punitive damages in just the right cases might strike a better
balance.
At this point, though, the real world again rears its ugly head. Whatever
else one wants to say about the exclusionary rule, one of its virtues is that it
is currently in place. To his great credit, Amar goes out of his way to
emphasize that his reform proposals must be considered as a package." 6 In
his view, abolition of the exclusionary rule without the strengthening of
damage remedies and injunctive relief that he also favors is unacceptable. It
is wrong to criticize Amar for advancing proposals that are not currently
113. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987) (holding that a police officer is shielded
from liability if a reasonable officer could have believed that the search comported with the Fourth
Amendment).
114. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 440-41 (1984).
115. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639.
116. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 180-81 n.5.
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politically feasible. Good legal scholarship can sometimes change what is
politically feasible. Nonetheless, in the current political environment, the
chance of replacing the exclusionary rule with a truly effective network of civil
remedies is close to zero. If current protections are indeed dismantled, they are
not likely to be replaced with the carefully calibrated, thoughtfully designed
system that Amar favors." 7 Instead, we are likely to see what Amar most
fears-adoption of those parts of his proposal that weaken Fourth Amendment
protection and rejection of the parts that strengthen it. A constitutional
pragmatist must accept the world as she finds it. Given the political realities
of our world, the warrant requirement and exclusionary rule, for all their faults,
may be about the best that we can do.
C. Amar's Fifth Amendment Proposals
Similar difficulties plague Amar's efforts to reform self-incrimination law.
Once again, Amar's recounting of the history of the Amendment and of the
development of the derivative use restriction is fascinating. He convincingly
demonstrates that the restriction is contrary to historical understandings and
that its doctrinal underpinnings are weak. Amar again fails, however, to make
a normative link between the past and present. Why should we be bound by
historical understandings if they fail to achieve modem objectives? Indeed,
apparently recognizing the normative emptiness of his historical and textual
project, Amar expends much of his effort defending his proposals as sound
policy.
Many readers are likely to be unsympathetic to this endeavor from the
outset. Amar's entire policy argument is premised on the assumption that the
privilege serves only instrumental goals-that it is designed to do no more than
promote reliable determinations of guilt or innocence."' Amar's position
therefore rejects a long tradition that treats Fifth Amendment rights as
significantly limiting the extent to which a liberal state can coerce even guilty
defendants.1 9 This tradition emphasizes the distinctions between the
117. For arguments along similar lines, see Tracey Maclin, fhen the Cure for the Fourth Amendment
Is Worse Than the Disease, 68 S. CAL L. REv. 1, 56 (1994); and Steiker. supra note 76, at 848-49.
118. For similar criticisms of Amar, see Yale Kamisar. On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations.
Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 MICH. L REv. 929, 93841 (1995).
119. See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961) (holding that a coerced confession should
be suppressed even if trustworthy); LEONARD LEvY, ORIGtNS OF THE FIFn A.MENDMENr 332 (2d ed. 1986)
(emphasizing the connection between the privilege against self-incrimination and freedom of expression
as well as political and religious liberties). For contemporary work in this tradition. see, for example, DAVID
LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JusncE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 194 (1988); and Robert S. Gerstein. Privacy and Self-
Incrimination, 80 ETHICS 87 (1970). I have discussed this tradition at greater length in Louis Michael
Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L REv. 673, 71947 (1992) [hereinafter Seidman. Brown and
Miranda]; Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction of Criminal Law
and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97, 130-36 (1996) [hereinafter Scidman. Points
of Intersection]; and Louis Michael Seidman, Rubashov's Question: Self-Incrimination and the Pmblem
of Coerced Preferences, 2 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149, 162-73 (1990).
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collective and the individual and between body and mind. On this view, the
collective has legitimate jurisdiction over an individual's body. It can
appropriately force him, against his will, to submit to harsh punitive measures.
What it cannot do is harness his will. A defendant can be punished, but she
cannot be made to consent to her own punishment by willing acts of self-
destruction.
Perhaps these ideas are hopelessly old-fashioned or simply incoherent,1
20
but they are too important and firmly grounded to be altogether ignored. Nor
is it sufficient to claim, as Amar does, that the noninstrumental view of the
privilege is inconsistent with existing doctrine.12' Indeed, this claim is more
than a little ironic, since Amar himself calls for a comprehensive overhaul of
existing doctrine so as to bring it into line with his approach.
In any event, most existing doctrine fits quite nicely with the
noninstrumental view. For example, advocates of this view need not be
embarrassed by the fact that the privilege applies only to defendants in
criminal cases. Amar is right to point out that the state regularly requires
individuals to reveal embarrassing information about themselves in the civil
context.' 1 Similarly, individuals can be made to testify in criminal cases
against close friends and relatives."t2 Still, criminal punishment poses a
special problem for a liberal state. The criminal sanction represents the most
coercive measures such a state can bring to bear on an individual. The risk that
individuals will be completely subsumed for collective purposes is at its height,
and the condemnation that accompanies the criminal sanction amounts to
something close to exile from the moral community. It is hardly surprising,
then, that there should be special safeguards ensuring defendants the right to
refuse to cooperate in this process-a right to hang on to some shred of their
individuality by not consenting to their own punishment.
Nor are cases like Schmerber v. California24 inconsistent with this
approach, as Amar supposes.1t 5 True, the blood test that the court permitted
in Schmerber entailed the use of the defendant's body for state purposes. But
this use was permissible precisely because the state used only the defendant's
body. Because blood tests can be performed against an individual's will, they
do not require the harnessing of will that the Fifth Amendment condemns.' 26
120. I have suggested some of the problems with them in Seidman, Points of Intersection, supra note
119, at 131-36.
121. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 66-67.
122. See id. at 66.
123. See, e.g., People v. Delph, 156 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1979) (denying the testimonial privilege
to an unmarried couple who lived together); Young v. Knight, 329 S.W.2d 195 (Ky. 1959) (holding that
a juvenile can be forced to testify against her father).
124. 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (holding that requiring a defendant to submit to blood testing does not
violate the Self-Incrimination Clause).
125. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 66-67.
126. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 261 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) ("Schaerber...
did not compel the person actively to cooperate--to accuse himself by a volitional act .... ").
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Other identification techniques, like voice and handwriting exemplars,' do
require exercise of will. These tests pose harder Fifth Amendment problems,
but there is a case to be made for their permissibility as well because the
techniques arguably do not intrude upon a defendant's inner thought
processes-his knowledge, hopes, beliefs, and desires-that are the subject of
Fifth Amendment protection.12 In contrast, using the defendant to locate
incriminating real or testimonial evidence cuts strongly against the Fifth
Amendment's noninstrumental policy goals. The state can learn of the
defendant's belief about the location of evidence only by harnessing his will
and then using it to achieve the defendant's own destruction.'"
The power that these ideas have over us is no better illustrated than by
Amar's own inability to escape them. If factual reliability were the sole
touchstone of Fifth Amendment law, one should favor use of a defendant's
coerced testimony when extrinsic evidence can corroborate the testimony. The
compelled statement of a murder defendant revealing the location of the hidden
weapon is highly reliable, and if reliability were the only concern, we should
favor admission not only of the weapon, but also of the statement itself.' °
127. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (voice); Gilbert v. Califormia. 388 U.S. 263
(1967) (handwriting).
128. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 216-17 (1988) (holding that a written statement was not
"testimonial" for Fifth Amendment purposes because it "shedl[ no light on [the defendant's) actual intent
or state of mind").
129. Amar asks rhetorically:
Doesn't the government use a suspect as the testimonial instrument of his own destruction when
it secretly invades his house (with a warrant), wiretaps his conversations without his consent.
and then uses his own words against him in a criminal rial? Or when it subpoenas the
defendant to fumish extant documents written in his own hand and then uses those documents
at trial? Or when it compels a defendant to authorize (with words) the release of his own bank
statements and then uses the authorization and bank statements to convict him?
AMAR, supra note 1, at 215 n.141 (citing Doe, 487 U.S. 201 (1988); Andresen v. Maryland. 427 U.S. 463,
470-77 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438. 462
(1928)).
Apparently, Amar believes that the answer to each question is "yes." Each of these cases, however.
is consistent with the noninstrumental view because in each of them. the incnminating material was
voluntarily created. For example, no one compelled Olmstead to have the conversations that were
wiretapped or Doe to create the incriminating bank records. Indeed, in Olmstead and Andresen the
defendant was not compelled to do anything at all. Even the most extravagant reading of the Fifth
Amendment privilege does not bar government gathering of evidence without defense cooperation. Fisher
and Doe are harder cases because some defense cooperation was required. Perhaps for this reason they are
wrongly decided under a noninstrumentalist view. At a minimum, though, the Court's reasoning attempts
to accommodate that view. The decisions rest on the judgment that the compelled cooperation did nothing
to reveal the defendant's inner mental state in an incriminating fashion. Thus, while the matenal produced
was incriminating, its creation was not compelled; while production of the material was compelled, the
production was not incriminating testimony.
130. Cf Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961). The Court wrote:
To be sure, confessions cruelly extorted may be and have been, to an unascertained extent.
found to be untrustworthy. But the constitutional principle of excluding confessions that are not
voluntary does not rest on this consideration. Indeed, in many of the cases in which the
command of the Due Process Clause has compelled us to reverse state convictions involving
the use of confessions obtained by impermissible methods, independent corroborating evidence
left little doubt of the truth of what the defendant had confessed.
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Yet apparently, Amar opposes the admission of corroborated statements.' 3'
Similarly, someone concerned solely with reliability should have no
objection to a system under which the government could call random
individuals before a tribunal where they would be asked, on pain of contempt
if they were to refuse and perjury if they were to lie, to admit to any crimes
they had committed within, say, the last five years. Amar claims to have
Fourth Amendment objections to such a scheme,132 but this explanation will
not do. The "seizure" that occurs when an individual is forced to appear in
court hardly rises to a level that merits constitutional protection. The Court has
never held that an ordinary witness, subjected to a subpoena to testify in an
ordinary case, can assert a Fourth Amendment right not to appear. 33 Nor has
it suggested that jurors, subjected to much lengthier "detention" in the
courthouse, have valid Fourth Amendment claims. Concern about the "search"
of the witness's mind is closer to the mark. The Court has, however, frequently
held that invasions that do no more than reveal incriminating evidence are not
"searches" for Fourth Amendment purposes."3 Questions directed solely at
prior criminal conduct would seem to elicit no more than this. Moreover, as
Amar himself acknowledges, 135 ordinary witnesses, who are frequently called
upon to reveal embarrassing facts about themselves, enjoy no Fourth
Amendment right not to testify.
Thus, if there is something wrong with dragnet procedures forcing ordinary
citizens to confess criminality, it lies neither in Fourth Amendment restrictions
131. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 228 n.265. He exhibits some ambivalence on this score:
Nor are reliability concerns always cured by a physical corroboration test, because many
confessions may concern internal mental states, where misunderstandings are quite likely. In
short, physical evidence can at best partially rather than fully corroborate a statement. To the
extent the physical evidence partially corroborates, it can be introduced itself. To introduce the
confession in addition risks introduction of unreliable and uncorroborated aspects of the
confession-say about the defendant's mens rea. Perhaps, however, the trier of fact could be
told merely that "something defendant said" led the police to the victim's body, the stolen
goods, or what have you. On the other hand, this paraphrase looks rather like defendant
witnessing-it is an account of defendant's own words-and, as with all paraphrases, introduces
reliability concerns of its own.
Id To the extent Amar opposes admission of corroborated statements on reliability grounds, his argument
is unconvincing. It is hard to see why all corroborated statements need to be suppressed because some of
them are unreliable. Moreover, introduction of the physical evidence is often not an adequate substitute for
introduction of the statements leading to that evidence. Consider, for example, the hypothetical discussed
in the text. Simply allowing introduction of the weapon may do little to advance the prosecution's case.
The important fact is not that the weapon was found, but that the defendant knew where it was. There Is
a sense in which this fact concerns an "internal mental state[)," but it is hard to see how the evidence
relating to that state is unreliable, or why a misunderstanding is "quite likely." If there are indeed other
cases where there is a problem with reliability or misunderstanding, these statements could be suppressed
on this ground.
132. See id. at 87.
133. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1973) ("It is clear that a subpoena to appear before
a grand jury is not a 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment sense, even though that summons may be
inconvenient or burdensome.").
134. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 118-22 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
707 (1983).
135. See AMAR, supra note I, at 65.
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on searches and seizures nor in a Fifth Amendment built on the foundations
of reliability. Our strong intuition that procedures of this sort exceed
constitutional bounds is rooted instead in concepts about appropriate limits on
government coercion and appropriate boundaries of individual freedom-in
short, on the very values that Amar wants to reject.
Suppose, though, that despite all this, one were fully convinced that
assuring factual reliability was the only legitimate function for the privilege.
Does it follow that one would then favor Amar's approach? I think not.
First, it is important to understand that far less is at stake here than one
might think. At first blush, it seems that the abolition of derivative use
immunity would give the government extensive new powers that it now lacks.
In every case, the government could call the defendant to the stand prior to his
trial and use his testimony to gather additional evidence against him. It turns
out, however, that the government already enjoys something not far removed
from this authority.1 36 The Supreme Court has already all but abolished
derivative use immunity in the Miranda context) 37 Police, therefore,
currently are free to question defendants without Miranda protection and to use
the answers they provide to develop additional evidence. Similarly, there is
little if any protection remaining for incriminating documents. If the
government has not compelled the creation of the document, then it is usually
permitted to compel its production on the ground that the creation of the
content of the document is not compelled and the production is not
incriminating. 138 If the government does compel the document's creation,
then forced production is often permissible under the "required records"
exception to the privilege. 13
9
When we strip away all of this, what Amar's proposal amounts to is the
grant of additional power to secure the defendant's oral testimony prior to trial
through subpoena and the contempt power, rather than through the implicit
coercion inherent in police interrogation. And even with respect to this change,
there is less than meets the eye. To see why, we need to compare more
136. I do not mean to endorse the holdings of all the cases I discuss in the paragraphs that follow.
Some of these cases may read the privilege too narrowly, especially if one takes a noninstrumcntal
approach. My only claim is that, as a positive matter, much of what Amar wants to achieve can be
accomplished under existing law.
137. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304-09 (1985) (refusing to suppress a confession as fruit of
a statement secured in violation of the Miranda rule), Michigan v. Tucker. 417 U.S. 433, 438-46 (1974)
(refusing to suppress testimonial evidence as fruit of a statement secured in violation of Miranda); cf
United States v. Gonzalez-Sandoval, 894 F.2d 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that Tucker and ElsIad
apply to physical evidence).
138. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409-14 (1976). Fisher does not apply to cases where
the very act of production is incriminating. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605. 612-14 (1984). The
logic of Fisher suggests that the government could surmount this difficulty by granting the defendant use
and derivative use immunity for the act of production.
139. See Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 7-16 (1948); cf Baltimore City Dep't of Soc. Servs.
v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 554-62 (1990) (rejecting a Fifth Amendment pnvilege not to produce a child
under court supervision).
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carefully Amar's proposal with current doctrine. Two points are worthy of
note. First, as mentioned above, 40 Amar would not permit the government
to use its new power against just anyone. Before an individual could be hauled
before a court, the government would have to lay an appropriate foundation for
his testimony.'4 ' Amar is vague as to what this foundation would consist of,
but it seems to amount to some sort of preliminary showing that the witness
is likely to possess incriminating information.'42 Second, the Supreme Court
has been very clear that the Fifth Amendment privilege functions as a shield,
but not as a sword.'43 This means that while the government cannot use
compelled testimony to meet its own burden of proof, neither can the
defendant use invocation of the privilege to meet his burden.
This limitation on the privilege has some important consequences. One
consequence is that the government can often avoid the privilege by the simple
expedient of shifting the burden of proof. Amar's concern about invocation of
the privilege in contexts like government employment'" is therefore
overblown. Often, the government can make an employee testify about
suspected wrongdoing by shifting the baseline such that the employee must
prove his suitability for the job, rather than the government proving
unsuitability. 4
5
The government has some ability to shift the baseline even in the criminal
context by turning elements of the offense into affirmative defenses. 46 When
it does so, the defendant cannot meet his burden by invoking the privilege and
is pressured by the threat of conviction into testifying to prove the defense.
140. See supra text accompanying note 132.
141. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 87.
142. Amar writes:
Fourth Amendment standards would constrain both the government's right to demand answers
in general-the government must justify its decision to single a person out for detention
(seizure) and interrogation (search)-and the government's right to ask any particular question.
Irrelevant questions, questions for which no foundation had been laid, intrusive or embarrassing
questions, repetitive questions-all these should be subject to a general Fourth Amendment test
of reasonableness.
Id.
143, See United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 758 (1983). As the Court declared:
We think the view of the Court of Appeals would convert the privilege from the shield against
compulsory self-incrimination which it was intended to be into a sword whereby a claimant
asserting the privilege would be freed from adducing proof in support of a burden which would
otherwise have been his. None of our cases support[s] this view.
Id.
144. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 53.
145. Compare, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 79-84 (1973) (holding that the state cannot use
invocation of the privilege to refuse to contract with a contractor), with Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota
Pub. Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 856-58 (1984) (holding that an applicant for a student loan
cannot use invocation of the privilege to prove that he has registered for the draft). For a more detailed
discussion, see Seidman, Points of Intersection, supra note 119, at 152-53.
146. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 233-36 (1987) (upholding a scheme placing the burden of
proof on the defendant to demonstrate self-defense); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-05 (1977)




Although the Court has been unclear about the point, there is presumably some
limit on the government's ability to utilize this device. Whereas the
government may force an employee to prove every element of continued
suitability for a job, it may not force on a defendant the full burden of
demonstrating innocence.1
47
Still, the government can shift the baseline through the force of its
evidence. So long as the government's case will not withstand a motion for a
judgment of acquittal, the defendant is free to assert the privilege and not
cooperate in any way in the prosecution. Once the judge holds that the case is
strong enough to go to the jury, however, there is nothing unconstitutional
about the compulsion the defendant then feels to testify-compulsion that
derives from the threat of conviction if the defendant remains silent.1
4 8
Moreover, if the defendant succumbs to this pressure, he is not permitted
merely to tell his side of the story. Instead, he must also respond to appropriate
cross-examination.149 Of course, the prosecution is permitted to use both
statements made on cross-examination, and fruits derived from the statements,
to convict the defendant.
What, then, is the precise difference between the Amar proposal, on the
one hand, and the status quo, on the other? The difference seems to come
down to three factors. First, neither the Amar proposal nor the current doctrine
permits pressuring of defendants without some preliminary showing of guilt.
Under current doctrine, the preliminary showing must be strong enough to
convince the judge that a reasonable jury would be justified in returning a
conviction. Because Amar is so imprecise, it is hard to know how strong a
case he would require before a defendant could be questioned. Perhaps the
standard is less stringent than this, but we simply cannot be certain until Amar
spells out his scheme in more detail.
Second, under the current regime, the pressure exerted on the defendant
is in the form of the threat of conviction for the underlying offense. Under
Amar's proposal, the pressure comes from the threat of conviction for
contempt. Depending on the circumstances, the pressure may be less intense
in the latter situation than the former. Under the current regime, the defendant
may believe that the jury will return an acquittal even if he remains silent;
under Amar's proposal, the defendant is unlikely to believe that he will escape
147. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-65 (1970) (holding that the pmsecuuon must prove all
elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt).
148. See, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 83-84 (1970). As the Court in Wiliams wrote:
The defendant in a criminal trial is frequently forced to testify himself and to call other
witnesses in an effort to reduce the risk of conviction .... That the defendant faces such a
dilemma demanding a choice between complete silence and presenting a defense has never been
thought an invasion of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
Id.
149. See id. at 80-86. For a famous application of this principle. see Untied States v. Hearst. 563 F2d
1331, 1339 (9th Cir. 1977), in which the court held that Patricia Hearst could not testify in her own defense
unless she was willing to undergo reasonable cross-examination.
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a contempt citation if he refuses to cooperate. This difference is real, but it
amounts to a matter of degree, and its extent will depend upon the
circumstances. One can imagine circumstances where the threat of contempt
is less coercive than the threat of conviction. An individual faced with very
serious charges might be more willing to be held in contempt so as to avoid
alerting the prosecution to relevant evidence prior to trial than to forgo the
chances of acquittal by remaining silent at trial. Moreover, in many other
cases, the government's case is so strong that the defendant has no realistic
option but to take the stand if he is to have any hope of avoiding conviction.
Finally, there is the matter of timing. Amar would permit a defendant to
be pressured prior to trial; current doctrine permits pressure only after the
government has put on its case. But this difference, too, is easy to overstate.
First, when a defendant reveals important new information during cross-
examination, a trial judge currently has discretion to recess the trial so that the
prosecution can use this testimony to develop more evidence for use in
rebuttal.' 50 Second, it is unclear that the current regime prevents the
government from securing the defendant's testimony prior to trial. The key
here is that if the defendant elects to take the stand, the Constitution permits
the government to compel him to submit to cross-examination. If compulsion
is permissible at the moment of cross-examination, why should previously
compelled statements not be admissible as well?'5 '
150. Cf. Williams, 399 U.S. at 85-86 (holding that a court can grant the government a continuance on
the ground of surprise when alibi evidence is introduced).
151. The Court's willingness to allow the prosecution to impeach defendants who take the stand with
statements secured in violation of Miranda is consistent with this principle. See Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971). The Harris Court expressly relied upon the argument that a defendant who chooses to
take the stand thereby gives up his right not to undergo reasonable cross-examination based on testimony
that would be treated as unconstitutionally compelled if used in the government's case in chief. See id. at
225 ("Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own defense, or to refuse to do so. But that
privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury. Having voluntarily taken the stand,
petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more
than utilize the traditional truth-testing devises of the adversary process." (citations omitted)); see also
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (holding that prosecutors could use a defendant's inculpatory
statements to impeach his testimony even though he had asked for a lawyer and had not yet received one).
In New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979), however, the Court distinguished Harris and Hass
and held that immunized testimony could not be introduced to impeach a defendant. See id. at 459 ("[A]
defendant's compelled statements, as opposed to statements taken in violation of Miranda, may not be put
to any testimonial use whatever against him in a criminal trial."); cf. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605,
607-12 (1972) (holding that a statutory requirement that the defendant be his own first witness if he took
the stand at all unconstitutionally penalized his right to remain silent). If the Portash opinion is taken
literally, compelled pretrial testimony cannot be utilized against a defendant who chooses to testify. There
are nonetheless good reasons that Portash should not be so read. First, the opinion nowhere explains why
so much should turn on the timing of the compulsion. If it is constitutional to compel statements at the
moment of cross-examination, what is wrong with the admission of previously compelled statements?
Second, Portash creates a serious conflict between Harris and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Miranda held that custodial statements given in the absence of the warning and waiver procedure were
unconstitutional because they were "compelled" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. See id. at 467.
If "compelled" speech cannot be admitted to impeach a defendant who takes the stand, as Portash holds,
then what is the justification for Harris?
In subsequent cases, the Court has suggested that statements secured in violation of Miranda may not
actually be compelled in the constitutional sense. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985)
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Perhaps, then, under current law, the prosecution could accomplish
something quite close to what Amar proposes: It could haul the defendant
before a judge, question him about the crime, and use the resulting testimony
in the event that the defendant elected to take the stand. Put differently, instead
of affording the defendant full-scale use and derivative use immunity, the
government need only inform the defendant that it would not use the testimony
if the defendant elected to remain silent at his trial. Of course, whether the
defendant elects to remain silent is a function of the strength of the
government's case. But Amar's proposal also conditions the prosecutor's
ability to question the defendant on the strength of its case.
The upshot, then, is that Amar's proposal is somewhat oversold. Its
adoption would make some difference, but it is unlikely to accomplish the
("The Miranda exclusionary rule.., sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. It may be
triggered even in the absence of a Fifth Amendment violation."). Still, a third reason for a limited reading
of Portash is that it creates tension with other Fifth Amendment doctrine unrelated to the Miranda rule.
For example, in Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980), the Court held that the Fifth Amendment
had not been violated when the defendant was impeached by his failure to turn himself in prior to arest.
In general, however, the government may not make evidentiary use of silence because such use tends to
compel speech. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614-15 (1965). The Jenkins Court distinguished
Griffin o  the ground that a person who elects to testify thereby waives his right to resist the introduction
of compelled speech against him:
It can be argued that a person facing arrest will not remain silent if his failure to speak later can
be used to impeach him. But the Constitution does not forbid "every government-imposed
choice in the criminal process that has the effect of discouraging the exercise of constitutional
rights." . . . [In Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494 (1926). we] explicitly rejected the
contention that the possibility of impeachment by prior silence is an impermissible burden upon
the exercise of Fifth Amendment rights. "we are unable to see that the rule that (an accused
who] testifies ... must testify fully, adds in any substantial manner to the inescapable
embarrassment which the accused must experience in determining whether he shall testify or
not."
Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236-37 (citations omitted).
Similarly, in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), the Court upheld against Fifth Amendment
attack a requirement that criminal defendants provide notice of an alibi prior to tral. Although the
defendant might feel pressured to reveal his alibi testimony, this pressure did not violate the Self-
Incrimination Clause because it was "of the same nature as [that which) would induce him to call alibi
witnesses at trial: the force of historical fact beyond both his and the State's control and the strength of the
State's case built on these facts." Id. at 85. Because this pressure was not unconstitutional dunng trial. it
followed that it was not unconstitutional prior to trial:
Petitioner concedes that absent the notice-of-alibi rule the Constitution would raise no bar to
the court's granting the State a continuance at trial on the ground of surprise as soon as the alibi
witness is called. Nor would there be self-incrimination problems if, dunng that continuance.
the State was permitted to do precisely what it did here prior to trial: take the deposition of the
witness and find rebuttal evidence. But if so utilizing a continuance is permissible under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, then surely the same result may be accomplished through
pretrial discovery, as it was here, avoiding the necessity of a disrupted tnal.
Id. at 85-86. Williams precisely parallels the situation posed by a defendant required to testify about a crime
prior to trial with the understanding that the evidence will not be admitted unless he testifies at trial. If the
notice-of-alibi rule is consistent with the Fifth Amendment because it concerns only the timing of
disclosure, it would seem that a pretrial deposition would be consistent with the Fifth Amendment as well.
Concededly, it is difficult to reconcile the Portash opinion with this outcome. The holding, however, might
be reconciled on the ground that Portash was afforded comprehensive use and derivative use immunity prior
to his testimony. Perhaps it violates the Fifth Amendment to tell the defendant that he has immunity, but
then to utilize the immunized testimony against him. Cf Doyle v. Ohio. 426 U.S. 610. 618 (1976) (finding
that due process is violated when a defendant is told that he has the right to remain silent, and then his
silence is used against him).
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sweeping change that he imagines. Put differently, even if the Fifth
Amendment is viewed solely from an instrumental perspective, the current
regime does less to protect the guilty, and Amar's reforms do less to punish
them, than he claims.
There is also a deeper reason that instrumentalists should be skeptical of
Amar's reforms. Suppose Amar is right to claim that his reforms would do
more to punish the guilty. Is he also right to claim that the prosecutor's new
powers would not harm the innocent?' 52 There is a sense in which he is
correct. A defendant's compelled oral testimony may make her appear guilty
when she is in fact innocent. In contrast, when a defendant's testimony leads
to physical evidence or other witnesses, the way in which the evidence is
located provides no reason to doubt its reliability.'53
The problem becomes more complex, however, if one thinks more
carefully about what "guilt" and "innocence" mean in this context. Although
these terms are central to Amar's argument, he nowhere defines them, and it
turns out that the effort to do so significantly undermines his project.
Superficially, it might appear that Amar has implicitly adopted a positivist
definition: "Guilt" is determined by the positive law that defines the offense
in question. On reflection, however, it becomes clear that this definition is
inconsistent with Amar's normative project. The law defines guilt and
innocence through procedural, as well as substantive, provisions. If the guilty
are simply those the law defines as guilty, then defendants who are not
convicted because of current Fifth Amendment protections are not "guilty."
Thus, a positivist "guilt-or-innocence" approach fails to provide critical
leverage with which to attack the current system.
It follows that Amar must have implicitly adopted a normative standard for
guilt and innocence. The question is not whom the law actually punishes, but
whom the law ought to punish. But once the definition is opened up in this
way, it is no longer so clear that current Fifth Amendment doctrine fails to
protect the innocent. Amar's assertion that it does simply restates his rejection
of the noninstrumental interpretation of the Fifth Amendment privilege. In
contrast, a person who embraces a noninstrumental approach will believe that
the Fifth Amendment protects the "innocent" when it prevents the state from
convicting people through use of procedures that are normatively objectionable.
152. Amar makes a valid point when he asserts that current Fifth Amendment doctrine sometimes
harms the innocent by preventing defendants from presenting exculpatory evidence, see AMAR, supra note
1, at 49-51; see also supra text accompanying note 21, but this problem could be addressed without a
wholesale rethinking of Fifth Amendment doctrine. First, it is not obvious that Fifth Amendment rights
should prevail when they come in conflict with the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. Even
if they do, the problem might be substantially mitigated by forcing the prosecution to grant immunity when
necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice or by forcing the witness to claim the Fifth Amendment
privilege before the jury. See supra note 26.
153. Even this point requires qualification. Alerting the prosecution to evidence prior to trial might
give an unscrupulous prosecutor the opportunity to mold her case around the evidence. To this extent,
abolition of derivative use immunity might harm the innocent.
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Moreover, even if we put this argument to one side, there is still another
sense in which current Fifth Amendment law protects the innocent. A recent,
brilliant article by William Stuntz'5 provides a useful entry into the
difficulty. Stuntz argues that an equilibrium develops between substantive
criminal law and constitutional procedural protections. On his view,
legislatures may respond to expanded procedural protection by criminalizing
more conduct, thereby granting the police more discretion. 5 Stuntz advances
this argument as a critique of procedural protections. He maintains that they
are counterproductive because they lead legislatures to criminalize more
conduct and to punish that conduct more severely. But the significant point for
our purposes is that Stuntz's argument can also be made to run in the other
direction. If one believes that legislatures start with a tendency to
overcriminalize and overpunish conduct, but that there is some limit on the
extent to which they can respond to procedural changes, such changes might
protect the innocent by making the prosecution and detection of crime more
costly, thus mitigating the overpunishment that legislatures would otherwise
mandate.
It must be said that this technique operates in a crude fashion. There is not
a necessary nexus between the particular defendants protected by the Fifth
Amendment privilege and the particular defendants who receive sentences that
are too long or are punished for conduct that should not be made criminal in
the first place. Still, Fifth Amendment doctrine may provide indirect protection
for the innocent. The current legal regime forces the prosecution to use more
resources to catch and convict defendants than it would have to use if it were
unconstrained by the privilege. If we assume that there are limited resources
available for these purposes, it follows that prosecutors and police must
prioritize. There will be many factors that go into their decisions, but surely
one of them will be the perceived seriousness of the offense. Hence, it seems
sensible to suppose that Fifth Amendment protection indirectly leads to
increased protection for people who are "innocent" in the sense that they do
not deserve the kind of punishment they would otherwise receive.'5
154. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. I (1997).
155. See id. at 7.
156. In his celebrated dissent in Morrison v. Olson. 487 U.S. 654 (1988). Justice Scalia objects to the
independent counsel statute on grounds that parallel this argument for the Fifth Amendment privilege.
Scalia complains that the independent counsel is not required to prioritize and. therefore, is likely to bring
cases that should not be prosecuted:
"One of the greatest difficulties of the position of prosecutor is that he must pick his cases.
because no prosecutor can even investigate all of the cases in which he receives complaints....
What every prosecutor is practically required to do is to select the cases for prosecution and to
select those in which the offense is the most flagrant, the public harm the greatest, and the proof
the most certain .
The mini-Executive that is the independent counsel ... is intentionally cut off
from ... the perspective that multiple responsibilities provide. What would normally be
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Even if the reduction does not produce these distributive effects, it seems
certain that, in the aggregate, an increase in the cost of prosecution and
conviction will reduce the length of prison sentences. If one believed that
sentences are currently much too long, an aggregate reduction is a step in the
right direction.
Obviously, this is a second-best solution. It would be far more efficient if
the courts directly constrained overcriminalization and overpunishment. As
Stuntz points out, however, the courts have not been very successful in
developing doctrine that accomplishes these ends. 57 In any event, we need
to focus once again on the fact that Fifth Amendment doctrine is already in
place. A conservative Supreme Court is quite unlikely to develop new
protective doctrine under, say, the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. It
will be much harder for it to dismantle existing doctrine under the Fifth
Amendment. In the real world, then, the privilege may play an important and
unacknowledged role in protecting the innocent.
Of course, this argument rests on the assumption that the political branches
in fact punish too much crime too harshly. There was a time when this
assumption was an article of faith among criminal procedure liberals. Today,
that faith is no longer widely shared. To see why the faith developed in the
first place, and why it has declined, we need to look more closely at the short
and troubled history of criminal procedure liberalism.
III. THE RISE AND FALL OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LIBERALISM
To some degree, of course, the decline of the liberal position on criminal
justice is but one aspect of the decline of liberalism more broadly. We live in
a conservative age, many former liberals have been swept away by the tide,
and more than a few are even swimming with it. Still, criminal justice issues
pose a special problem for liberals. To see why, we need to focus on the
reasons that liberals supported the criminal procedure revolution in the first
place. This support turns out to be more puzzling than it may at first seem:
There is a sense in which the identification between liberalism and the
aggressive support of Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights has always been
anomalous. The fact that today it is the militias and the National Rifle
Association that are supporting Fourth Amendment rights may therefore reflect
no more than a return to a more natural state of affairs. S5
regarded as a technical violation ... may in his or her small world assume the proportions of
an indictable offense.
Id. at 727-28, 732 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Robert Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, Address
Delivered at the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys (Apr. 1, 1940)).
157. See Stuntz, supra note 154, at 66-69.
158. I explore these arguments in more detail in Seidman, Brown and Miranda, supra note 119, at
721-27; and Seidman, Points of Intersection, supra note 119, at 125-40.
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A century ago, it was often conservatives who argued for Fourth and Fifth
Amendment protection.'5 9 As Amar points out, the great early criminal
procedure cases-in particular Boyd v. United States'60 -are full of the
language of legal formalism, the protection of property rights, natural law, and
defense of a private sphere.' 6' In the run-up to the New Deal revolution,
liberals fought against all of these things. They were for freeing government
from the shackles of natural law limitations, for government intervention, for
redistribution, and against trying to erect legal principles on chimerical notions
of private freedom of will.' 62 The fight against Lochner'63 was both a
struggle for political-as opposed to judicial-supremacy and a struggle
against the assumption that the distribution of power in the private sphere was
natural, just, and inevitable.
It is worth remembering, in this context, that vigorous police enforcement
of the criminal law is a form of government intervention designed to curb the
exercise of private power. It is also a form of redistribution. Public money is
used to provide protection for those who lack the private resources to protect
themselves, in much the way that social security or welfare reallocates results
reached in private markets.
There is a sense, then, in which Amar's rejection of Warren Court criminal
procedure precedents keeps faith with the central commitments of New Deal
liberals. If this is so, however, we need to ask why liberals were attracted to
the Warren Court's views in the first place. Why did liberals seek to erect
constitutional barriers to vigorous government action in this field even as they
were tearing down barriers to other forms of redistribution and government
activism?
There are two principal reasons that liberals of an earlier generation were
attracted to criminal justice issues. The first relates to race. '6' Blacks and
whites have had different historical experiences with the criminal justice
system--experiences that affect their judgments about it to this day. For many
whites, the police represent protection from private violence. When one views
their function in this way, support for the police is consistent with the support
liberals accord to government more generally when it protects against private
coercion. For blacks, in contrast, the police were often allied with private
perpetrators of violence and oppression. The criminal justice system-
159. See William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE LI. 393, 419-
28 (1995).
160. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
161. See AMAR, supra note I, at 22.
162. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal. 101 HARV. L REv. 421, 423
(1987).
163. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
164. See Robert M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minonties. 91 YALE
LJ. 1287, 1305-06 (1982); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions.
82 VA. L. REv. 1, 62-64 (1996).
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especially the third degree and the trumped-up charge-helped to enforce a
regime of Jim Crow and racial oppression. The lynch mob, enforcing its own
brand of racial justice with police acquiescence, is a central image in the
historical memory of many African Americans,' s powerfully and recently
invoked in settings as divergent as the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings
and the O.J. Simpson murder trial.
For New Deal liberals interested in redistribution, this experience with Jim
Crow meant that liberal arguments ran in the opposite direction when it came
to the criminal law. Whereas freeing government from constitutional restraints
was associated with social justice in other contexts, racial justice required the
imposition of constitutional restraint. This restraint was especially important
at the local level, where racist-dominated police forces were an important part
of the Jim Crow system. 66 The constitutionalizing and nationalizing thrust
of Warren Court reforms therefore made sense to many liberals.
Even when criminal justice reforms were not about race, liberals had a
second, related reason for supporting them. One important branch of New Deal
liberalism sought to replace old-fashioned conceptualist analytic techniques
with rationalistic, scientific, policy management approaches.'67 Some liberals
of this stripe saw the criminal justice system as shot through with
irrationalities, of which racism was just a special case. On this view, judicial
control was essential in order to bring sense to a system dominated by
prejudice, corruption, and inefficiency. Criminal justice professionals, as
opposed to the untutored cop on the beat, understood that policies of mass
arrest and detention on less than probable cause, or of regularly coercing
confessions, were simply not sensible ways of using scarce law enforcement
resources.'68 The warrant and probable cause requirements were designed not
so much to protect privacy per se as to provide prior judicial oversight
ensuring that searches were cost-justified. Rules against involuntary
confessions were designed not solely to protect an inviolate human will (an
argument that Lochner supporters would have understood), but also to assure
factual accuracy of jury verdicts.
165. For discussions of the ways in which lynching reinforced the Jim Crow regime, see NEIL R.
McMLLEN, DARK JOURNEY: BLACK MISSISSIPPIANS IN THE AGE OF JIM CROW 224-53 (1989); and JOEL
WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE: BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE
EMANCIPATION 109-19 (1984).
166. See Cover, supra note 164, at 1303.
167. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN
AMERICA 227 (1976) (discussing the New Deal commitment to flexibility and instrumentalism); PETER H.
IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LAWYERS 9-10 (1982) (describing the apolitical professionalism of New Deal
lawyers).
168. See Amsterdam, supra note 81. at 421 (arguing that a police rulemaking requirement would mean
that "[m]any practices not tolerated in individual cases... would not be approved or authorized by the
police command structure itself if it were required to assume responsibility for determining the propriety
of those practices as a general mode of departmental operation").
2316 [Vol. 107: 2281
Criminal Procedure Liberalism
A second technocratic argument, closely linked to the first, held that it was
barbaric and ineffective to attempt to control crime through force. Crime was
a "disease" rather than a manifestation of evil, and could most effectively be
controlled by treating its "root causes."' 69 In the long run, attacks on the
conditions causing crime, and rehabilitation of those who committed crime,
would do much more to solve the problem than incarceration."o
Both the anti-racial-subordination and the technocratic arguments for
judicial supervision of the criminal justice system retain some vestigial force
today. But both have come under sharp attack in recent years. Thus, some
liberals continue to defend criminal justice protections as part of the attack on
racism, but the argument has become more difficult to make out as black
neighborhoods have been decimated by crack and drive-by shootings. Scholars
like Randall Kennedy have taught us that African Americans are
disproportionately victimized by crime as well as by the criminal justice
system and that racism can take the form of under-policing as well as
overpolicing.171 Under the tutelage of Kennedy and others, white liberals
have begun to relearn in this new setting the great lessons of American Legal
Realism: Forceful government intervention may be necessary to make people
free, and there is nothing necessarily natural, just, or inevitable about the
distributions of power that result when the government remains passive. The
point remains true whether the power is exercised by drug lords or by captains
of industry.
Moreover, much of modem criminal procedure doctrine does not mesh
well with the view that treats Warren Court reforms as part of the project of
racial liberation. To the degree that police intervention remains a civil rights
issue, it is because the police regularly hassle, harass, and humiliate young
black men on account of their race. But the linchpin of much modem Fourth
Amendment law is informational privacy, a concern that has little to do with
the typical street encounter. As others have forcefully argued,'7 the Fourth
Amendment's preoccupation with informational privacy is anomalous in the
post-New Deal period, in which the administrative state demands personal and
embarrassing information from us on a regular basis. The civil rights concern
is not about the revelation of information, but about the personal invasions,
169. See, e.g., BARBARA WOOTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: REF.ECTIONS OF A MAGISTRATE
AND SOCIAL SCIENTIST 18 (1963) (suggesting medical parallels to the search for causes of crime);
BARBARA WOOTrON Er AL, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL PATHOLOGY 267 (1959) (arguing that "the
primary purpose of classifying socially inadequate persons as defective should be to make available to them
whatever help they need").
170. For a representative and influential example of arguments along these lines, see KARL A.
MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISHMENT (1968).
171. See KENNEDY, supra note 55, at 29-75.
172. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Privacy' Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure. 93 MICH.
L. REV. 1016, 1029-34, 1052-54 (1995).
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inconveniences, and humiliations that are the standard tools of aggressive
patrolling.
This disconnect is made worse by reliance on the exclusionary rule as the
main means of Fourth Amendment enforcement. I argued above that the
problems with the exclusionary rule are overstated and that it may in fact be
the most efficient means of deterring Fourth Amendment violations.' That
said, it is undoubtedly true that the exclusion of reliable evidence in a criminal
trial is too much for many Americans to swallow and that it has resulted in
civil rights-criminal procedure liberals fighting on a political terrain that is
uniquely unfavorable to their cause. It must also be conceded that to the extent
that the Fourth Amendment is equated with the exclusionary rule in popular
debate, the Fourth Amendment is made to seem irrelevant to what most
concerns civil rights liberals. In some ways, a regime of "stop and frisk" is the
modem analogue of Jim Crow rules in the old South-a system designed to
keep "dangerous" young blacks under control by constantly reminding them
of who is in charge and what their station in life is during every public
moment. But, as Amar correctly suggests, to the extent that the police are
interested in no more than harassment, the threatened suppression of evidence
provides little incentive for them to change their behavior t74
A parallel series of developments has weakened the technocratic argument
for constitutional control over the police. Today, it is revisionists like Amar,
rather than criminal procedure liberals, who make the most forceful cost-
benefit arguments.'" Thus, it is generally acknowledged today that the
rehabilitative project that liberals once favored has, for whatever reason, failed,
and there is little remaining public support for treating crime as a "public
health" problem. 76 With regard to police misconduct, it has come to be seen
173. See supra notes 97-117 and accompanying text.
174. See AMAR, supra note 1, at 28 (contending that "fu]nder the exclusionary rule, the more guilty
you are, the more you benefit"). Chief Justice Warren made this point when he inaugurated the stop-and-
frisk doctrine. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1968) ("The wholesale harassment by certain elements
of the police community, of which minority groups, particularly Negroes, frequently complain, will not be
stopped by the exclusion of any evidence from any criminal trial." (citation omitted)). Warren's opinion,
however, never explained why the "reasonable suspicion" standard the Court embraced was more amenable
to exclusionary rule enforcement than the warrant and probable cause standard it rejected.
175. For other revisionist proponents of this view, see, for instance, Joseph D. Grano,
Introduction-The Changed and Changing World of Constitutional Criminal Procedure: The Contribution
of the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Policy, reprinted in A CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ANTHOLOGY
35, 39 (Silas J. Wasserstrom & Christie L. Snyder eds., 1996) (arguing that the exclusionary rule is an ill-
conceived policy); and Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417 (1985) (arguing
that Miranda strikes the wrong cost-benefit balance).
176. When Congress established the United States Sentencing Commission, it expressly provided that
"[t]he Commission shall insure that the [federal sentencing] guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of
imposing a sentence to a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant or providing
the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment,"
Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 217(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2022 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 994(k) (1994)).
For examples of liberals who came to doubt the wisdom of "public health" approaches, see ANDREW
VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976); and Alan M. Dershowitz, Preventative
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that the judicial tools available to criminal procedure liberals were too blunt
to control behavior effectively in the way such liberals desired.'n For
example, police may respond to a tightening of the probable cause requirement
by the simple expedient of arresting more individuals for minor crimes or
extracting more supposed "consents" for searches.
Judicial tools may be not only ineffective, but also unnecessary. Today,
many believe that the project of "professionalizing" police forces has largely
succeeded.1 78 Internal constraints are far more effective than they once were.
Moreover, some police practices that liberals once condescendingly treated as
irrational and prejudiced may make some sense. In the Fifth Amendment
context, for example, Amar is right to argue that compelled statements can be
an efficient way to discover reliable evidence. In the Fourth Amendment
context, the recent experiences of New York and other cities demonstrate that
there is at least some reason to think that the kind of police hassling of
"undesirables" to which liberals object may be a cost-effective method of
controlling crime.
179
It is not even clear that racial discrimination in law enforcement is
completely irrational. There is a persistent and disturbing correlation between
race and crime: Young black men are disproportionately more likely to commit
certain street crimes than members of some other ethnic groups.IW0 There can
be no doubt that racist stereotypes cause many to exaggerate this correlation.
Nor can there be any doubt that some of the correlation is itself an artifact of
discriminatory exercises of prosecutorial and police discretion. But if it is a
mistake to overstate the correlation, it is also a mistake to pretend that it does
not exist. Hence, if one examines the question solely from a technocratic point
of view, it may be rational to target young black men for special police
attention.
As this example illustrates, although criminal justice liberals were initially
motivated by both justice and technocratic concerns, the two are in some
Confinement: A Suggested Framework for Constitutional Analysis. 51 TEx. L REv. 1277, 1321-24 (1973).
177. For a detailed argument along these lines, see Stunt, supra note 154.
178. See, e.g., ROBERT E. FOGELSON, BIG CITY POLICE 219 (1977); Richard A. Leo. Criminal Law:
The Impact of Nfiranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 621. 678 (1996).
179. See GEORGE L. KELLING & CATHERINE M. COLES, FIXING BROKEN WINDOWS: RESTORING
ORDER AND REDUcING CRIME IN OUR COMMUNITIES 106-56 (1996).
180. As Randall Kennedy has recently written:
It does no good to pretend that blacks and whites are similarly situated with respect to either
rates of perpetration or rates of victimization. They are not. A dramatic crime gap separates
them. In relation to their percentage of the population, blacks on average both commit more
crimes and are more often victimized by criminality. The familiar dismal statistics and the
countless tragedies behind them are not figments of some Negrophobe's imagination. The
country would be better off if that were so. Instead, the statistics confirm what most careful
criminologists (regardless of ideological perspective) conclude: In fact (and not only in media
portrayal or as a function of police bias) blacks, particularly young black men, commit a
percentage of the nation's street crime that is strikingly disproportionate to their percentage in
the nation's population.
KENNEDY, supra note 55, at 145 (footnote omitted).
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tension with each other. Efforts to control the police discretion that gives rise
to discriminatory law enforcement may result in not only more crime, but also
in less privacy. Consider, for example, the problem posed when the police
suspect a motorist of having committed a crime, but have less than reasonable
suspicion to stop him. The Court has held that it violates the Fourth
Amendment to single out individual cars for reasons that fall below the
reasonable suspicion threshold.'8t On the other hand, the Fourth Amendment
permits the police to establish a roadblock where all cars are stopped without
suspicion of any kind.'
From the perspective of racial justice, these decisions make some sense.
By insisting that the privacy invasion be suffered by a broader and more
randomly determined class of people (whoever passes through the roadblock
rather than individuals the police choose to stop), the Court attempts to link
minority rights to majority interests. By insisting that all people bear equal
privacy losses, the Court forces the political process to take account of costs
that might be ignored if they fell only on politically vulnerable groups. This
is, of course, a venerable strategy for the protection of minorities, associated
in an earlier era with Chief Justice Stone'83 and, in our own time, with the
work of John Hart Ely.8'u
We should not overstate the extent to which this strategy achieves its
stated goals, however. As already noted, judicial tools tend to be too blunt an
instrument for effective control of police discretion.8 5 They do nothing to
control pretextual stops.'86 Nor, for that matter, do they control the location
of the roadblock, which may be determined without judicial supervision. 7
Moreover, from the perspective of efficiency, this regime produces quite
perverse results. The Court's rule makes the constitutionality of police tactics
turn on the willingness of police to invade more privacy. Instead of only
stopping the cars whose drivers are suspected of illegal activity, now all cars
passing through the roadblock must be stopped. Stranger still, the rule seems
to permit stops precisely because there is no reason to suspect that the stop
will be productive. Officers who have some basis for a stop, albeit falling
below the reasonable suspicion threshold, are more constrained than officers
181. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979) (disallowing random, discretionary spot checks of
motor vehicles on Fourth Amendment grounds).
182. See Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
183. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 783 (1945).
184. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsTRUsT (1980). For a discussion of the intersection
between Ely's theory and Fourth Amendment law, see Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis Michael Seidman, The
Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEo. L.J. 19 (1988).
185. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
186. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
does not prohibit pretextual stops).
187. See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 460 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the police have too much
discretion to choose the location of a roadblock); cf Merrett v. Moore, 58 F.3d 1547, 1551 (11th Cir. 1995)
(upholding a "mixed motive" roadblock).
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who have no basis at all. It follows that a regime that allows police to target
their efforts, even if they lack reasonable suspicion, may actually be more
protective of privacy than a regime designed to constrain police discretion.
We are left, then, with the question why anyone would prefer more
invasions of privacy to less, especially when the job can be done more
effectively with less. Conceivably, we may be able to control police discretion
by preventing officers from targeting individuals in ways that may be
invidious. But this advance is achieved at the cost of not only less effective
law enforcement (a cost that, we need to remember, is itself borne
disproportionately by minority communities), but also of more privacy
invasion.
In summary, then, there are good reasons that many liberals no longer
support Warren Court criminal procedure reforms, although they are by and
large not the reasons Amar offers. The reforms may indeed represent a large-
scale historical mistake. They may be premised on assumptions about the
naturalness and justice of the private sphere that liberals have elsewhere rightly
rejected. I88 Moreover, they may not have advanced the cause of racial justice
or concentrated law enforcement resources where they are most needed, as
liberals once hoped. Does it follow that the project of imposing constitutional
control on police behavior should be abandoned? Perhaps it should, but it
seems a shame that the reasons that the project might still be of value are so
rarely articulated.
The best argument for Warren Court reforms rests on some uncontroversial
empirical facts and a very controversial normative conclusion. The facts are
these: As of midyear 1997, there were 1,725,842 men, women, and, yes,
children, in federal and state prisons and local jails, an increase of 4.7% over
the previous year.189 Even before this latest increase, 615 of every 100,000
United States residents were behind bars,"9 which is far more than in any
other industrialized nation except for Russia, which has a rate of 690 per
100,000 residents. 19' Our rate is more than five times that of Canada, more
than six times that of Great Britain, and more than sixteen times that of
Japan. 192 Within the past decade, our prison population has doubled on a per
188. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Lochners Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873. 874-75 (1987) (attacking
Lochner as resting on government inaction, a defense of the existing distrbution of wealth and cntitlements.
and acceptance of a baseline established by the common law).
189. See DARRELL K. GILLIARD & ALLEN J. BECK. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS B.L-nN-
PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 1997. at I (1998), available at (visited Jan 19. 1998)
<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/pjim97.txt>.
190. See CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA & ALLEN J. BECK. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULIETIN"
PRISONERS IN 1996, at 2 tbl.1 (1997). available at (visited Jan. 19, 1998) <http./www.ojp usdoj.gov/bjst>
191. See MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT. AMERICANS BEIIIND BARS' U S. AND
INTERNATIONAL USE OF INCARCERATION 1995. at 3 (1997). Tables of relevant statistics are available on
the Internet at (visited Jan 19, 1998) <http.//www.sproject.compress-12.htm>.
192. See MAUER, supra note 191, at 4 tbl.I.
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capita basis. 193 To be sure, the most recent figures indicate a decline in the
rate of increase-although only in the rate of increase and not in the numbers,
which continue to go up. 94 It should be noted, as well, that the decline
comes before the new spate of "three strikes, you're out" laws takes full
effect-laws that bid fair to rescue Medicare from collapse by turning our
prisons into huge, publicly subsidized nursing homes for superannuated
prisoners.
It is, of course, true that if we incarcerate a high enough percentage of our
total population, at some point, sooner or later, we will reach an equilibrium
where crime will begin to decline. Perhaps we have reached this point. It is
here, though, that the controversial normative conclusion takes hold. The
conclusion is that this situation is simply morally unacceptable. One could
have a long discussion about what it means to have a free country, or about
what the objectives of constitutional democracy should be, but it should at
least be clear that a nation that incarcerates a huge percentage of its population
is not free, and that a constitution that permits this outcome has not succeeded.
The question, then, is what, if any, relationship there is between our rules
of criminal procedure and these outcomes. There are four possibilities. The
first is that we have high incarceration rates because we have high crime rates,
and that we have high crime rates at least in part because our criminal
procedure rules "handcuff' the police. If this view is correct, then it is easy to
see why liberals have abandoned Warren Court reforms. To be sure, there
remains an argument grounded in individual rights for not taking effective
actions to address serious social dislocations. But arguments of this sort are
associated with Lochner-like, conservative ideologies. For liberals who are
consistent, it seems hard to defend a system that protects the rights of a few
criminals at the expense of the rights of their many victims.
A second possibility, perhaps more likely, is that we have high
incarceration rates because we have high crime rates, but that crime rates are
a product of broad social disintegration and simply have nothing to do with
criminal procedure rules. If this view is correct, liberals are right to turn their
attention elsewhere. It makes far more sense to use scarce political resources
in an attempt to address the causes of social disintegration than to fight a
losing and ineffectual battle over a set of irrelevant legal rules.
Although the final two possibilities will strike many readers as
paradoxical, they need to be considered. Perhaps our high rates of incarceration
are doing little or nothing to combat crime, and Fourth and Fifth Amendment
law is actually helping prosecutors to produce these higher rates. In recent
years, crime rates have remained static or declined, but incarceration rates have
193. See MUMOLA & BECK, supra note 190, at 3.
194. The average yearly increase for the years 1990 to 1996 was 7.3%, compared with 5% for 1996.
See id. at 2 tbl.2.
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continued to increase.'95 This increase may be caused by the public
perception that crime is out of control and that draconian punishments are
necessary to deal with it. Popular misconceptions about criminal procedure
may feed this perception. Because people believe that legal technicalities set
large numbers of guilty and dangerous criminals free, they may think that too
many miscreants are escaping punishment. Because they believe that the
problem could be brought under control if only the legal technicalities were
changed, they fail to focus on the bankruptcy of mass incarceration as a crime-
fighting strategy. In other words, on this view, the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments serve to legitimate outcomes that would otherwise seem
unacceptable. The public believes that the police face tremendous legal
obstacles in controlling crime, and it follows from this belief that the few
people they do manage to catch should be treated as harshly as possible.
Although he nowhere articulates it in quite this way, this hypothesis might
provide support for Amar's program. Perhaps a new social contract could be
formulated whereby the police are freed from procedural constraints that
hamper prosecutions of the guilty in return for a substantial reduction in the
use of incarceration as an all-purpose social remedy.
I, too, have some sympathy for a grand bargain of this sort.' % The
solution is especially attractive in light of the modem Court's evisceration of
Fourth and Fifth Amendment protection. Given the ineffectiveness of those
protections as currently interpreted and the public perception that they are
nonetheless seriously hampering law enforcement, we might be better off if we
stopped pretending that the police were seriously constrained and started facing
up to our vast overdependence on incarceration.
There are nonetheless some difficulties with this approach, at least as
compared with an effort to reinvigorate criminal procedure. First, it is not clear
that the approach would reduce aggregate rates of incarceration. Instead, it
might only broaden incarceration costs. True, sentences would be shorter, but
the police, freed from procedural constraints, would catch more people who
would be subject to incarceration. If one believes that there are already too
many people under criminal jurisdiction, this may be a step in the wrong
direction. Perhaps more seriously, this approach would increase, rather than
reduce, police presence in the everyday lives of inner-city residents. It would
mean more harassment, more humiliation, and more police violence as
compared to an effort to take criminal procedure protections seriously.
These costs may ultimately be worth the benefit if they in fact produce a
reduction in crime. There is a final possibility, however, that must also be
195. Compare MUMOLA & BECK, supra note 190, at 2 (noting a 5% increase in incarceration for the
United States in 1996), with FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNrrED STATES-1996. at 6 (1996)
(noting a 4% decrease in the crime rate index in 1996).
196. See Louis Michael Seidman, Criminal Procedure as the Servant of Politics. 12 Coxs.
COMMENTARY 207 (1995).
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considered. I am reluctant to call it a hypothesis-it may be no more than a
romantic hope. Still, it just might be that reinvigorating, rather than giving up
on, Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections could produce a reduction in
crime. Taking criminal procedure seriously might build a symbolic bridge
between those with and without power. It might signal to society's losers that
there are some limits on the extent to which a majority will use its coercive
power to get its way. The hope is that in exchange for this forbearance, the
people with the least reason to accept our social institutions might consent to
them.' 97
To be sure, with enough force and treasure, it is possible to enforce law
and order without such consent. If enough violence is applied-if enough
people are intimidated, incarcerated, and executed-sooner or later our criminal
classes will be cowed into submission. But the costs of this strategy are very
large, and as more and more people are subject to the jurisdiction of the
criminal justice system, the marginal benefits decline rapidly. On any given
day, nearly one in three African-American males in their twenties is under
some type of court supervision.'98 With numbers like these, it is simply not
possible to maintain the blaming function of the criminal law among the
groups we are trying to control. What results, instead, are pathologies whereby
a prison sentence becomes a rite of passage or, worse yet, a badge of honor,
whereby juries regularly nullify charges, and whereby still more draconian
penalties are necessary to coerce compliance, leading, in turn, to more
nullification. 199
The evidence of such pathologies is all around us; the racial divide in the
O.J. Simpson case is just the most dramatic example. Indeed, it is worth
197. For some empirical support for this view, see TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW
(1990). Tyler's empirical study found that "normative" methods of encouraging compliance-i.e., the
inculcation of "values that lead people to comply voluntarily"--are more cost-effective than "mechanisms
of deterrence that stem from instrumental control over reward and punishments." Id. at 161. According to
Tyler, "legitimacy plays an important role in promoting compliance," id., and "[p]rocedural justice is the
key normative judgment influencing the impact of experience on legitimacy," id. at 162. Procedural justice,
in turn,
is... related to interpersonal aspects of the decision-making procedure. People place great
weight on being treated politely and having respect shown for their rights and for themselves
as people. The way people are dealt with by legal and political authorities has implications for
their connection with the social group and their position in the community. It therefore has
important implications for self-esteem and group identification. People are unlikely to feel
attached to groups led by authorities that treat them rudely or ignore their rights.... People
will not feel identified with officials whom they regard as unresponsive to their problems and
unwilling to help and protect them.
Id. at 164 (citations omitted).
198. See MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS
AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIvE YEARS LATER 1 (1995). A summary of this report is available
on the Internet at (visited Jan. 19, 1998) <http.//www.sproject.com/rep4.htm>. In 1995, the average black
male was seven times more likely than the average white male to be imprisoned for more than one year.
See MUMOLA & BECK, supra note 190, at 9.
199. For a detailed discussion of racial disparities in punishment and some of their consequences, see
MICHAEL H. TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT: RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 49-80 (1995).
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remembering that the O.J. Simpson trial began with the trial judge's rejecting
what was almost certainly a valid Fourth Amendment suppression motion.oo
Concern about pathologies like these is nothing new. More than two
hundred years ago, at the founding of the republic, James Madison wrote the
following:
In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily
unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign
as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured
against the violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even
the stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their
condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak as
well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more powerful
factions or parties be gradually induced, by a like motive, to wish for
a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the
more powerful."01
In our own time, Ronald Dworkin has made the same point differently:
If we want our laws and our legal institutions to provide the ground
rules within which these issues will be contested then these ground
rules must not be the conqueror's law that the dominant class imposes
on the weaker .... The institution of rights is therefore crucial,
because it represents the majority's promise to the minorities that their
dignity and equality will be respected. When the divisions among the
groups are most violent, then this gesture, if law is to work, must be
most sincere.
... The Government will not re-establish respect for law without
giving the law some claim to respect. It cannot do that if it neglects
the one feature that distinguishes law from ordered brutality. If the
Government does not take rights seriously, then it does not take law
seriously either7. 2
Are Madison and Dworkin right? I have to say that I have my doubts. It
seems clear, though, that the ultimate fate of criminal procedure liberalism will
turn on this question, rather than on the nature of warrant practice in
eighteenth-century England. The time may indeed have come for us to give up
on the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Still, the last, best hope for avoiding an
endless escalation of the violence on both sides is to put in place some form
of mutual disarmament. A reinvigorated law of criminal procedure just might
be a starting point for this broader project. To give up on this hope and this
project is, in an important sense, to give up on the promise of liberal
200. See Henry Weinstein, Challenges to Evidence Ruling Dkely To Fail. Erperrs Say. LA. TI. MS.
July 8, 1994, at A23 (discussing the suppression motion in Simpson's real).
201. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 324-25 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.. 1961).
202. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 204-05 (1978).
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constitutionalism more generally and to opt instead for a regime supported only
by force and the threat of force. If any reason at all remains to work for a
reinvigoration of the law of criminal procedure, then that is it.
